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5Introduction
Policy Solutions has a long history of providing international 
audiences with in-depth analyses of Hungarian political life. Thanks 
to the support of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), for the fifth 
time we herewith present an annual review of Hungarian politics. 
This is a comprehensive overview of recent developments, events 
and trends in Hungary in 2018, and an outlook on what topics we 
expect to dominate Hungarian politics in 2019, the year of European 
and local elections. 
The target audience of this publication is students and academics, 
journalists, diplomats or international organisations. In other words, 
anyone who has an interest in the political, economic and social 
landscape of Hungary in 2018, be it the parliamentary election and 
the keys to Orbán’s success, the state of the Hungarian opposition, 
major developments in foreign policy, the main economic trends 
or the increasing pressure on the civil society, academic freedom 
and independent media. It is important to stress that our review is 
not chronological and does not claim to be exhaustive in its scope, 
rather it reflects our selection of the major developments over the 
past twelve months. 
In particular, we focus on five broad areas, presenting distinct 
developments in each. In the first section we review the year 
from the perspective of the Hungarian government, with a special 
emphasis on the main reasons behind the re-election of Viktor 
Orbán’s Fidesz party and the policy priorities of the fourth Orbán 
government. In the second section we look at the opposition parties, 
their state and prospects. The third section focuses on foreign 
affairs, in particular Orbán’s battles at the European scene, and 
Hungary’s foreign policy in a global context. In the fourth section, 
we take a detailed look at how Fidesz’s policies have shaped the 
economy, and special attention is paid to the controversial “slave 
law”. Finally, some key developments of the Hungarian society – 
changes in the media landscape, culture war, the Stop Soros bill and 
CEU’s departure – are discussed. All of the sections conclude with 
a brief analysis of the issues which may come to the fore in 2019.
The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of 
the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
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9On 8 April 2018, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was re-
elected to a third consecutive term after his right-wing Fidesz party 
won 49 percent of the vote, enough for a two-thirds supermajority in 
parliament (see Table 1). It was a decisive win for Orbán, who in recent 
years has clashed publicly with the European Union, becoming for 
many a symbol of illiberal nationalism now rising throughout the West.
Orbán’s victory is a product of several political factors, but three 
stand out: the systematic weakening of Hungary’s democratic 
system (this results in unfair advantages to the governing party), the 
success of Orbán’s anti-migration platform, and the fragmentation 
of the opposition.  
Backsliding away
The first ingredient in Fidesz’s electoral dominance is its rewriting 
of the rules of Hungarian democracy. The party began its current 
string of victories in 2010, when Hungarians’ disillusionment with the 
Socialist government – and more generally with the effects of the 
postcommunist transition and the 2008/9 financial crisis – allowed 
Fidesz to capture a constitutional supermajority, which it used to 
adopt a new constitution, change the country’s electoral laws, and 
assert government control over independent media, as well as 
making other, less conspicuous changes. In Hungary, the general 
discontent with the political system has allowed Fidesz to implement 
these radical changes without provoking effective public opposition. 
1.1  Hungarian elections 2018:  
Why Orbán won
Party
European 
political 
affiliation
Votes (party 
lists) Vote share Seats Share of seats
Fidesz-KDNP EPP 2,824,551 49.27% 133 66.83%
Jobbik - Movement for a Better Hungary NI 1,092,806 19.06% 26 13.07%
Hungarian Socialist Party & Dialogue for 
Hungary (MSZP & Párbeszéd) S&D-G/EFA 682,701 11.91% 20 10.05%
Politics Can Be Different (LMP) G/EFA 404,429 7.06% 8 4.02%
Democratic Coalition (DK) S&D 308,161 5.38% 9 4.52%
Momentum Movement ALDE 175,229 3.06% 0 0
Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party NI 99,414 1.73% 0 0
Table 1. 2018 Hungarian parliamentary election results
Source: National Election Office – valasztas.hu
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Since his party’s victory in 2014, moreover, Orbán has become 
even more radical. That year, he openly professed his desire 
to build an “illiberal state” and became more authoritarian in 
terms of both policy and rhetoric. In 2017, he escalated his war 
on nongovernmental organisations with a bill targeting foreign-
funded NGOs and adopted another controversial law that aimed 
to force out Hungary’s best university, the Central European 
University, from the country. And in a major speech during the 
2018 campaign, he promised to hold his opponents “morally, 
politically, and legally accountable” after the elections – a threat 
that had to be taken seriously given the experience of the past 
few years.
Such policies and rhetoric have begun to undermine Hungary’s 
democracy. Four years ago, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe concluded that the country’s elections were 
free but not fair – voters could vote for whomever they chose, but 
the playing field was tilted in favor of the government. The same 
assessment applies to the 2018 elections. Voters were offered a 
diverse choice of parties and candidates, but a number of factors 
gave the ruling party unfair advantages. As in 2014, the recent 
election was characterised by campaign regulations that clearly 
favored Fidesz, biased media coverage, and a blurring of the line 
between the ruling political party and the state (state funded party 
propaganda campaigns, State Audit Office fines on opposition 
parties, etc.). 
 
Migration matters
Another clear lesson of Hungary’s election is that migration was 
a winning issue for Orbán. Indeed, Orbán was so convinced that 
his tough stance would be enough to win that Fidesz campaigned 
exclusively on its opposition to immigration – the party did not draw 
up an election platform, made no economic or social promises, and 
did not participate in any debates.
Since the European migrant crisis began in 2015, migration has 
trumped all other issues in Hungary – in this respect, Orbán’s 2015 
decision to close his country’s border and his continued defiance of 
EU requests to accept refugees have both been politically popular. 
Migration has proven to be an effective tool in mobilizing voters, 
primarily in rural areas and in cities other than Budapest. Orbán has 
successfully persuaded his base that only he and his government can 
protect the country against the “Muslim invasion” and the pernicious 
influence of outsiders, including Brussels, the Hungarian-born US 
billionaire George Soros, Western liberals, and, most recently, the 
United Nations.
Although surveys suggest that Hungarians are aware of some of the 
downsides of Orbán’s rule – an Ipsos MORI poll shows that 72 percent 
of Hungarians are displeased with the country’s health care system, 
and according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index, Hungary ranks second to last in the EU in terms of corruption – 
for many the fear of migrants overrides other concerns. Since 2015, 
Orbán has accordingly placed migration at the top of his agenda, 
skillfully exploiting his party’s vast media empire in the process. This 
empire includes all of the country’s public media, which essentially 
operate as an extension of the ruling party’s communications 
division. Orbán has spent millions of euros in public money on 
spreading his propaganda using so-called national consultations – 
effectively expensive, taxpayer-funded push polls, in which survey 
questionnaires with manipulative questions were mailed to each 
household in Hungary, accompanied by public information (in reality, 
propaganda) campaigns in the mass media. 
The experience of the last few years shows that these national 
consultations have had a big impact on public discourse and attitudes. 
One clear effect is that 49 percent of Hungary’s voters apparently 
feared immigration more than they cared about corruption 
scandals and the other problems in their everyday lives. And since 
businessmen close to the prime minister have acquired large parts of 
the Hungarian media, Fidesz has practically monopolized the flow of 
information to the uncommitted and uninformed. Today, opposition 
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voices have very little ability to reach those rural voters who do not 
use the internet. This also contributes to Hungary’s increasing urban-
rural divide and thus to the enormous success of the government’s 
anti-migration propaganda in the countryside.
 
A fractured opposition 
The third major factor behind Orbán’s victory is his own success in 
uniting the right at a time when the opposition is weak and divided. 
Orbán has held his camp together for more than 15 years, using both 
economic and cultural nationalism to cement support from the more 
than two million voters who constitute the Fidesz base. In 2009, 
Orbán laid out a vision in which Fidesz could remain in power for 15 to 
20 years if it was able to establish itself as the “central political force,” 
with the opposition divided into left-wing and far-right blocs. After 
the collapse of the Socialist Party and the rise of the far-right Jobbik 
during the 2006–10 term of parliament, Orbán’s prophecy came true, 
and Fidesz became the only major party in the Hungarian political 
landscape.
Not only is the country’s opposition divided between the left and 
the far right, but the left itself is highly fragmented, meaning there 
is no single center-left party comparable to Fidesz’s position on 
the center-right. Hungary’s left-wing and liberal opposition parties 
learned nothing from their 2014 fiasco, in which their failure to 
coordinate allowed Fidesz to win another supermajority, and this 
year they cooperated even less than at the last elections. For most 
of the 2018 campaign – and despite huge pressure from the majority 
of Hungarian citizens who wanted change – left-wing and liberal 
parties competed with each other over who would dominate the left 
in the future, rather than working together to replace Fidesz.
A clear indication of this division was the lack of an overarching 
electoral list that included all left-wing and liberal parties. These 
parties should have focused all their energies on offering a joint 
alternative to Orbán’s illiberal regime; instead, there was an intense 
competition between the Socialists (MSZP-P), the left-liberal 
Democratic Coalition (DK), and the Greens (LMP) for the leading 
position on the left. These parties joined forces only in a small 
minority of the country’s single-member constituencies, meaning 
that in many districts where a united opposition had a chance to win, 
the opposition vote was split among multiple candidates. Although 
Fidesz’s majority was never in doubt, the party’s ability to win 
another supermajority did indeed hinge on the left’s lack of electoral 
coordination. Fidesz was therefore able to win two-thirds of the 
seats in parliament despite receiving less than 50 percent of the vote.
 
False hopes
After the elections, many in the opposition were left with the 
question of why they had clung to the illusion that the outcome could 
be different. There were two rational reasons for this misplaced 
optimism. For one, there was the overwhelming opposition victory 
in	the	Fidesz	bastion	of	Hódmezővásárhely	a	few	weeks	before	the	
national election. It appears to have been a mix of a protest vote, a 
soft and especially inconsequential warning for Fidesz to ease up 
on the corruption, combined with an appreciation for the fact that 
the opposition managed to unite behind an independent candidate 
whose politics broadly reflected the preferences of the right-wing 
town. 
The other reason that gave the opposition misplaced hope was 
an apparent surge in voter interest in the election. The correct 
assumption was that a low turnout was a definite indication of a 
Fidesz victory since the governing party’s base is highly committed 
and will always turn out, while opposition voters, lacking a candidate 
with a likely perspective of succeeding Orbán and sensing that Fidesz 
was heavily favoured to win, would stay a home. It was reasonable 
to assume that only a high turnout election held out any prospect of 
a successful performance of the opposition. Yet already during the 
day there were indications that higher turnout would not be limited 
to the areas where the demographics favoured the opposition, be 
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it of the Jobbik or the leftwing variety. Some of the most hardcore 
Fidesz regions registered the highest surges in voter participation, 
while Budapest voters on average saw lower rates of growth (from a 
higher base, however). A similar dynamic prevailed at the end of the 
day. It is still fair to say that a lower turnout election would have been 
even worse for the opposition, but it is also apparent that the general 
idea that the stakes were high mobilised both sides, government 
supporters and sceptics alike. 
What has proved largely a failure was the anticipation of tactical voting 
in the absence of official withdrawals by the nominating parties. The 
tacit hope on both the left and the far-right had been that they do not 
need to withdraw too many candidates in each other’s favour (which 
was also vital in terms of funding, as campaign support depends on 
the number of candidates that a party fields), in the end voters would 
figure out which opposition candidate to support. For the most part, 
that did not even work well enough within the broad centre-left, not 
to mention between Jobbik and the left. Given Fidesz’s overall level of 
support, successful tactical voting – this was the most unpredictable 
aspect of the 2018 elections – would not have been enough to turn 
the election, but it would have put a lot of seats into play and would 
thus have easily removed the possibility of another two-thirds 
majority. However, the big lesson for the opposition parties is that 
they cannot rely on tactical voting instead of withdrawing candidates 
in each other’s favour.  
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In trying to understand why the Orbán challenge is so difficult for 
the Hungarian opposition to tackle, part of the story may be that 
opposition politicians and analysts cannot even agree what kind 
of regime they operate in. What is fairly universally acknowledged 
now is that traditional categories established in political science 
cannot fully capture what is distinctive about this regime type, so 
an armada of new terms and categorisations vie for the public’s 
attention these days, each trying to establish themselves as 
the dominant new intellectual paradigm. While this may be less 
relevant than the specific political and policy responses offered 
by opposition politicians and international figures that need to 
interact with the Orbán regime in practice, the categorisation, 
and especially the underlying content, obviously also shape their 
responses. 
So, at the outset of our presentation of the policies of the fourth 
Orbán government, let’s take a very brief look at the various 
conceptual frameworks that have been advanced to understand and 
explain the Orbán government. The “classical” definition was first 
proposed by Orbán himself, who talked about his desire of building an 
“illiberal state” in the aftermath of his 2014 election victory. The term 
was of course borrowed from Fareed Zakaria’s famous 1997 essay, 
but Orbán did not flesh out his ideas in any detail. But at least there 
is a practice, and based on Orbán’s own dictum of “watch what I do, 
not what I say”, we can draw the rough contours of an illiberal state: 
it is a regime in which temporary governmental interests, as well 
as the private interests of certain ruling party politicians and allied 
businesspeople, ride roughshod over basic democratic principles. At 
the same time, the national interest is defined as being coterminous 
with factional interests in society. 
Competitive authoritarianism, hybrid regime 
or mafia state? 
Looking at the same phenomenon from the outside, Bálint Magyar, a 
former liberal politician and education minister, has labelled the Orbán 
regime a “mafia state” that is exclusively focused on rent-seeking and 
the unbridled extraction of societal surplus, extending the governing 
party’s control over areas of public administration and especially 
judicial/oversight institutions where direct political influence should 
not be present. Magyar sees the Orbán government’s methods of 
rent “collection” and the general logic driving their political operation 
as similar to those of the mafia. To some extent, one could say that 
this view is myopic, in that it glosses over some of the policy activities 
of the Orbán government, and especially the scope and relevance of 
its political engagement with the public, that is its ongoing, Herculean 
efforts at holding a sizeable political camp together. There is, in other 
words, a very public aspect of Fidesz’s activities, which is the Achilles 
heel of the mafia analogy. However, even though Magyar’s approach 
may be too limited in its focus, in many respects its description of 
Fidesz’s modus operandi is dead on. 
Two more technical terms that seek to capture the phenomenon 
from a social scientific angle are the concepts of competitive 
authoritarianism and hybrid regimes. The promoters of these 
concepts (political scientists András Bozóki, Gábor Filippov, Zoltán 
Gábor	 Szűcs,	 among	 others)	 argue	 that	 despite	 the	 widespread	
domestic perception that the Hungarian situation is unique, the 
Orbán government is a reflection of a broader international trend in 
which governments try to scale back those aspects of democratic 
operation that might loosen their hold on power, while preserving key 
1.2  The Fourth Orbán government 
begins its work
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symbolic trappings of genuine democracies, especially voting. Most 
fundamentally, while by and large citizens are free in the act of voting, 
the process of democratic will-formation is undermined substantially 
and the “fair” aspect of the democratic process is severely impaired. 
Counter to the “mafia state” theory, this approach argues that the 
primary driver of the government’s policies are political rather than 
economic considerations (i.e. rent-seeking), and that the diverting 
of taxpayer funds is not a goal in itself but merely a tool for building 
political power. 
Ultimately, to decide whether the extraction logic is subordinate 
to the authoritarian political mission or the other way around, one 
would have to read Viktor Orbán’s mind. So without resolving the 
fundamental mystery, let us look at how the Orbán government’s 
policy focus shapes up at the outset of the prime minister’s third 
successive (and fourth overall) term. 
 
Make family great again
Orbán has made clear that the fundamental challenge he wants to 
tackle is demography, specifically the problem of declining population. 
This chimes with his broader narrative of saving Hungary from the ill-
effects of western decadence, in particular migration. In addition to the 
fact that it is a genuinely important policy issue, demography is also 
particularly expedient because family-friendly policies always allow 
for highlighting their “evil twin”, immigration: the government’s most 
recent propaganda initiative, the so-called National Consultation on 
the family, starts out with contrasting the “western solution” to the 
demographic crisis, namely immigration, with the Hungarian response 
of helping families. It is vital for Fidesz to keep the migration issue on 
the agenda, and in the absence of refugees, the demographic crisis 
appears to be one rhetorical element for making sure that people will 
not forget about the constantly looming threat of a foreign invasion. 
What the prime minister does not say explicitly but is clearly implied 
in the design of his policies and occasionally the accompanying 
rhetoric, too, is the special challenge that he wants to improve 
demographic indicators by focusing exclusively on the middle and 
upper-middle classes, trying to freeze out as far as possible the poor 
from the benefits of the policies designed to incentivise child-bearing. 
Apart from the moral dimension, this also raises the bar for the 
government: it must improve demographic indicators while relying 
on a relatively small segment of the population, a not insignificant 
subset of which does not necessarily ideologically identify either with 
the government or its family policy goals. 
 
Subsidising the wealthy again
Wisely, the government has thus far eschewed potentially 
controversial approaches such as limiting abortion and has vested 
its hopes in the primary policy instruments that are potent across 
ideological boundaries, namely money. The Orbán Cabinet is 
specifically subsidising childbirth through tax benefits that primarily 
accrue to high earners and extremely generous housing benefits (an 
expansion of the CSOK programme) that are limited to those who 
can provide what are effectively matching funds or at least access 
to a credit line. Despite its exceedingly generous subsidies for new 
homes, at the current construction prices the government’s flagship 
CSOK programme does not provide enough money to build a home 
that matches the legal requirements, so those who want to use it 
must be able to invest their own money, which is arguably precisely 
the legislative intent. 
With regard to making CSOK bring about more children, the 
government’s line of attack will be two-pronged. For one, it raises the 
limit on the generous 10-million Hungarian forint state-subsidised 
credit line to 15 million (on top of a 10-million grant), which brings a 
total funds available for a new home to 25 million, worth about 8-9 
years of the average Hungarian net salary. At the same time, in a key 
concession to reality, the maximum credit line also applies to families 
with two children, in other words the government is realising that 
while three children for middle-class and upper middle-class families 
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might be the optimum, many families are loath to embrace the 
lifestyle despite the financial temptation. The same logic is applied to 
the tax benefit, which will double for families with two children. This 
should significantly broaden the personal scope of the government’s 
most basic demographic policies. 
What is still lacking in the broader strategy is an appreciation for and 
an adaptation to the lifestyle, employment and work-life balance 
difficulties facing families and especially women who decide to have 
children. It appears that the government does not intent to take 
major measures to facilitate the reintegration of mothers into the 
workforce, to make part-time jobs easier, or any other innovative 
methods of helping reconcile the challenges of modern life with that 
of the family. The hope appears to be that the massive financial 
inducement offered by the CSOK will be sufficient in itself, plus it 
will be especially alluring to those who are open to a traditional 
family model where the wife stays home. With the government’s 
financial offer, that could be more viable for many families who might 
otherwise never make enough to buy a home on just one salary. This 
kind of approach is also reflected in the abovementioned national 
consultation, which “asks” citizens whether they agree that the 
institution of “paid motherhood” (our emphasis) should be introduced, 
which would of course also lighten the financial burden of stay-
at-home mums. At the same time, however, the government also 
claims to have significantly expanded the number of creche places, 
which is not particularly innovative but is nevertheless definitely the 
exception to the broader trend of not helping women (and yes, it’s still 
mostly women) balance work and family. 
 
Upward-redistribution
The broader policy surrounding Orbán’s vision of supporting 
traditional middle/upper-middle class families also implies a 
redistribution of societal income and budgetary resources to this 
segment. This was the justification used for the sudden elimination 
of government subsidies for a programme that encourages housing-
related savings, the Housing Saving Fund (the law was first publicly 
mentioned on a Monday and it was effective law by Tuesday evening, 
a stunning speed even by Fidesz’s extreme standards of legal 
uncertainty). The programme had allowed for an annual subsidy of 
a maximum of 70,000 forints for annual savings of 240,000 forints 
dedicated to either home buying or home improvement. As analysts 
pointed out, at the time of zero interest rates, the subsidy made 
these savings very alluring, but for a variety of reasons – e.g. lack 
of information, lack of disposable income – only 13% of the general 
public availed themselves of the opportunity. And although these 
tended to be clearly in the general Fidesz-supported upper-middle 
class, the government now aims its policies even more narrowly: 
housing subsidies must be inextricably linked to child-bearing, and 
in that respect the Housing Saving Fund was not targeted enough. 
 
An even more difficult time to be homeless 
in Hungary
What is clear, however, is that being homeless in Hungary is going to 
be punitive even beyond the implied harshness of such a state of life. 
The government has used a controversial constitutional amendment 
to clamp down on rough sleeping in urban areas, effectively 
criminalising homeless for their life situation. While the government 
claims that there are sufficient shelter spaces available, experts flatly 
deny this. The announcement of 1 million euros in additional funds 
for shelters in Budapest, which are estimated to have space for only 
every second of the city’s growing homeless population, stood in 
stark contrast to the inauguration at roughly the same time by Viktor 
Orbán of another ca. 40 million euro, mostly taxpayer-funded sports 
facility. 
The government continues to aggressively attack every group that it 
perceives as alien or hostile to its vision of the national community, 
and for the time being the homeless and the strong liberal segment 
of Hungary’s cultural realm are the prime targets (we elaborate 
on the Orbán government’s cultural policies further down in this 
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publication). It is not clear if any other groups are in the crosshairs 
in addition to those the government already set its sights on 
immediately after its election victory, but with the introduction of 
the new, politically subservient administrative court system, the last 
remaining protection for those under attack from the government 
will be removed. Without independent judges, and with every inch 
of the public administration under Fidesz’s control, the best hope for 
potential opponents of the regime is to not become actual opponents. 
 
Creeping privatisation
A large question that looms is whether the government is willing 
to engage in any serious public policy reform in any area that is not 
directly pertinent to its core issue of raising the birth-rate. With 
regard to education and health, the two most neglected areas under 
Fidesz, there do not seem to be any grand plans on the horizon, but 
the process of creeping privatisation that we pointed out two years 
ago continues apace. In a move that surely would have had Fidesz on 
the barricades a decade ago, one of the major Hungarian institutions 
of higher education, the Corvinus University will become a private 
institution, which is likely to severely restrict public access to the 
renowned university. 
For a Hungary divided into two broad segments – one in which a 
small but discernible stratum has high quality private services at 
its disposal, and another where the masses have underfunded and 
dilapidated public institutions – to work, the elite needs private 
institutions. Since those are expensive, it is cheaper to just take a 
public institution and “privatise” it, as is happening with Corvinus. 
The only relevant actor in Hungarian society that could have stopped 
this from happening would have been Fidesz, but it is currently 
preoccupied with implementing it as one of its major – though never 
publicly admitted – policy objectives. 
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It appears that there is no rest ever for Viktor Orbán, and that seems 
to suit him just fine. After the decisive win at the parliamentary 
election of 2018, the government will be facing two further 
national electoral tests in 2019: the European Parliamentary 
election in May and the nationwide municipal elections in the fall. 
While there is not much doubt that Orbán’s Fidesz will win the 
European elections by a large margin, and the governing party is 
also likely to do well at the local elections, the race in numerous 
cities is expected to be much more competitive. 
Until 2014, the parliamentary and the municipal election moved 
in the same cycle, they were held a few months apart every four 
years. This usually served the interests of the governing party, for 
it was off a recent victory and usually still enjoyed a honeymoon 
with its voters (2006 and the release of Ferenc Gyurcsány’s secret 
speech	in	Őszöd	was	a	notable	exception).	The	decoupling	of	the	
two elections implies a risk for Fidesz, too: it will no longer enjoy a 
post-election bump next year, and if it fails to maintain its current 
high level of popularity it might for the first time since 2010 lose 
some of the near-total monopoly it has enjoyed over the life and 
especially the budgets of the larger Hungarian municipalities (the 
legion of tiny municipalities are often dominated by independents). 
As always, one of the most important factors in Fidesz’s success 
will be how divided or united the opposition is.
1.3  Outlook on 
the Hungarian 
government’s 
prospects 
in 2019
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Another major factor that the government cannot control completely 
will be the state of the economy. The world economy has been 
growing persistently for almost a decade now, and in recent years 
that growth has appreciably accelerated, a factor that the Orbán 
government’s communication machinery craftily combined with 
the anti-migration propaganda to pull off its third consecutive two-
thirds majority in Parliament last April. But Orbán, who constantly 
envisions a potential doom anyway, is well aware that this cannot 
go on forever. The prime minister himself speaks of crisis, and the 
government’s massive gold acquisitions also suggest that they think 
it is a real possibility in the near future. 
When the economic skies turn darker, controlling information and 
keeping the opposition divided will become more important than 
ever. As long as Orbán is in power, politics will remain the primary 
domain of Hungarian public affairs, to the detriment of policy. So the 
question is what’s next for Hungarian politics? The question that 
has been haunting the opposition, international players, as well as 
analysts and intellectuals, is whether Orbán will ever have enough 
power over political life in Hungary to stop him from concentrating still 
more financial and other resources in his hands and from keeping the 
opposition down by anti-democratic means. The recurring version of 
this question is whether there will ever be a point when the regime 
will move from its quasi-revolutionary phase to a consolidated 
phase. Eight years of prior experience suggest that the answer to this 
question is plainly “no”, which also sets the scene for 2019. 
With regard to keeping the opposition down, there is very little to 
do for Fidesz, although they will continue to track the situation 
and intervene by any means necessary if any of the opposition 
players threaten to even slightly upset the status quo. More 
importantly, the government needs the public to be caught up in a 
sense of fear, it needs enemies which – unlike the opposition in its 
current state – can be plausibly portrayed as a potent threat. For 
the time being, the migration story still works. Although the anti-
immigration campaigns have been successful despite the fact that 
refugees practically have not arrived to Hungary since 2015, the 
objective lack of refugees may make it difficult to counterbalance 
if the public’s attention would turn to economic and social issues. 
An economic slowdown in Europe would buoy Fidesz-friendly 
anti-establishment forces throughout the continent. Ironically 
the establishment party par excellence, Fidesz could benefit from 
the growing tension between the EU and the member states. 
In portraying Brussels as a powerful and dominant player that 
undermines the nation-state, the government skilfully exploits the 
EU’s very obvious weakness, which is manifest in its very inability 
to rebut the mendacious accusations that it wields huge powers – it 
can’t even communicate properly with the public it serves. At the 
same time, if objective conditions would turn a bit worse, one can 
expect the Fidesz media machinery to switch into overdrive in its 
efforts to create new fictional enemies. Except for those targeted, 
it will not really matter who it is as long as it serves to deflect 
attention from the real problems.
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2.1. The state  
of the left
In terms of the underlying dynamics, the up-close perspective of 
the leftwing and liberal parties in Hungary differs substantially from 
the overview of the leftwing opposition in total. While there is some 
movement and rumbling at the level of individual parties and there 
are some discernible shifts in the support of some key players on the 
left, the situation of the left overall is still best characterised by the 
two keywords that have described it for most of the time in the years 
since Fidesz struck communications gold with the discovery of the 
migration issue: stagnation and paralysis. 
 
Stagnation and paralysis
The Hungarian party system on the left has some of the marks of the 
famous pillarised society in the Netherlands, in that some major and 
minor players appear to have consolidated the long-term support of 
a subsegment of the electorate, and a high proportion of the voters 
in the respective subsegments cannot imagine voting for either 
the government or for another centre-left formation. Despite their 
agreement that ousting the Orbán government is the paramount 
goal, these parties have thus far not found a common ground on 
how they can unite their forces to achieve that objective in light of 
the challenge posed by an electoral system that is extremely punitive 
of small parties. The party leaderships appear torn on the extent to 
which they can subordinate either their ideals – which often include a 
strong rejection of other centre-left parties as dated, Fidesz-friendly, 
etc.– or their own political interests to the common cause. 
In addition to stark personal antagonisms, there are major cultural 
and generational gaps between the broad camp that makes up the 
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centre-left now, especially since this diverse segment now also 
subsumes a significant number of voters and some politicians, too, 
whose values and even self-identification is in fact rightwing, even 
if it is fundamentally different from Fidesz’s conception of rightwing 
politics. Although there is a growing awareness that Fidesz’s level 
of dominance harbours greater risks than cooperating with the 
other opposition parties, the invisible wall that divides former prime 
minister Ferenc Gyurcsány and his Democratic Coalition (DK), for 
example, from the often right-leaning, younger supporters of LMP, 
appears firm. The remaining leftwing and liberal media continue 
to pummel the other parties on the left, and many of their leaders 
continue to insist that cooperation with other parties must be either 
limited or is practically only conceivable if the other parties submit 
to them. 
Some leftwing voters have begun to punish this intransigence by 
turning towards electoral apathy; in stark contrast to the aftermath 
of the 2014 election, when the opposition seemed to be turning a 
corner towards the end of 2014 and in early 2015, winning a series of 
impressive by-election victories while Fidesz voters tended to stay 
home (this lasted until the refugee crisis turned the dynamic around), 
almost all minor elections that have occurred since the parliamentary 
election of April have shown a reverse dynamic, a totally demotivated 
opposition and a highly motivated Fidesz base. This is also reflected 
in the polls, where the proportion of non-voters is on the rise again, 
and surveys also show that a growing segment of the electorate is 
becoming convinced that Hungary under Fidesz is no longer clearly 
a democracy. 
 
The mask slips
Fidesz is an extremely potent force both in terms of putting cracks 
into the walls that keep the opposition fragmented and divided as 
well as in using all instruments at its disposal to fix whatever cracks 
emerge. The government’s increasingly unscrupulous wielding of its 
vast powers and its open disdain for the entire opposition tend to 
generate situations these days that temporarily override the deep 
divisions on the left. 
A recent episode in Parliament, which has both theoretical and 
practical implications, brought the new alignment into sharp relief. 
As the government proposed a bill that would dramatically curb 
workers’ rights by drastically raising the amount of overtime that 
employers can demand, the entire opposition was united in outrage. 
The late night parliamentary session was presided over by Sándor 
Lezsák, a veteran Fidesz politician. Lezsák was eager to end the 
debate and go home, and he used his position to cut off opposition 
speakers on highly dubious allegations of violating the house rules, 
such as repeating themselves, criticising the chair’s management of 
the session, and the like. One after the other, opposition politicians 
had their microphones cut and informed that they would no longer 
be able to speak in the debate. As the absurdity of the situation 
become apparent, a growing number protested by yelling. When 
Lezsák finally gave the floor to the last remaining politician who was 
allowed to speak, the Jobbik politician Dániel Z. Kárpát, the visibly 
shaken MP said that out of respect for the memory of what used to 
be the democratic tradition in this chamber he does not want to avail 
himself of his allotted time to speak. 
 
A flash of unity
Later that night the ejected MPs took one of the most bizarre 
political group photo of the post 2010 Orbán era yet: the opposition 
MPs present at the debate of the “slave law” stood together for a 
photo that united them across party lines and spanning the entire 
spectrum of the opposition, from Jobbik to the Democratic Coalition, 
including people whose ideological and personal animosities are 
widely known. For one brief moment, the Hungarian opposition was 
totally united: shutting off the debate by abusing the power of the 
gavel had crossed the line in a way that united the opposition MPs 
behind a cause that allowed them to gloss over the invisible walls 
that separate them normally. What this episode did make clear is that 
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there is an agent in Hungary that can unite the opposition, and it is 
Fidesz when it becomes too careless and aggressive in the exercise 
of its unlimited powers. 
The Parliament’s passing of the Overtime Act and establishing new 
administrative courts under strong ministerial control sparked a 
series of protests after 12 December. A key novelty of these protests 
was that the opposition parties suspended their infights and stepped 
up against Fidesz’s decisions sharing the same platform. 
However, the fact remains that despite the occasional flashes of 
unity, the opposition remains divided for the time being, and the 
various players are still trying to figure out how to navigate the 
conflicting expectations of voters who demand opposition unity and 
their own base’s clamouring for independence or dominance of the 
centre-left. Let’s take a brief look at where each of the opposition 
parties stands a few months before the EP election in May 2019 and 
the nationwide municipal elections next fall.
 
MSZP-Párbeszéd
Despite a disappointing election result (12%), MSZP remains the 
largest force on the left. Moreover, its support is now on par with 
that of Jobbik, which has been the largest opposition party for years. 
Unfortunately for both parties, the convergence in their respective 
levels of support owes to Jobbik’s precipitous drop in the polls. Both 
parties are now backed by only 7% of the electorate at large, and 
their support stands at 11-12% among likely voters with a party 
preference. Despite being a party with mostly young faces at the 
national leadership level, MSZP still cannot get rid of the stigma of 
being an “old” party.
Following the election fiasco, chairman Gyula Molnár and the entire 
MSZP board resigned. In the subsequent battle for the leadership, 
former chairman Attila Mesterházy barely lost out to Bertalan Tóth, 
who has led the party’s parliamentary faction. While Tóth aims to 
stabilise MSZP’s position as the leading force on the left, the Socialists 
have also hitched their wagon to the star of Gergely Karácsony, 
a young politician at the helm of the small green-left Párbeszéd 
(Dialogue) party. Although Párbeszéd continues to operate as an 
independent party, the cooperation between the Socialists and the 
former LMP split-off is vibrant, and the green-left formation is the 
Socialists only link to young voters. However, the handicap of this 
approach is that even though polls consistently show Karácsony to be 
one of the most popular figures on the left, he has neither been able 
to convert this into tangible support for his own party, Párbeszéd, nor 
did it have a major impact on MSZP’s own election result last April. 
Apart from the cooperation with Párbeszéd, MSZP’s strongest claim 
to relevance remains its organisational structure, which is fading 
with its aging electorate. 
 
DK
After a poor election finish in April (Democratic Coalition had expected 
to challenge the Socialists for the top position on the left but ended 
up receiving only half as many voters as MSZP, while it took the 5% 
threshold with few votes to spare), DK has been inching up in the polls 
and is now in a solid second place on the centre-left spectrum with an 
8% level of support among likely voters. However, this level of support 
does not mean that DK would have new voters. Although party leader 
and former prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány remains one of Orbán’s 
staunchest critics, DK has not added any lasting innovative elements 
to the leftwing discourse in Hungary. Although Gyurcsány issued a 
“resistance” slogan in September, calling for major demonstration 
and a blockade of parliament, the attempt quickly fizzled and has 
been replaced by the standard retail politics events that Gyurcsány 
excels at. While these work in terms of energising the base, there is 
little evidence that this approach can draw new voters. 
The most likely explanation for DK’s recent rise in the polls is that 
it has a very strong and dedicated core electorate, and even as the 
other leftwing parties’ less committed supporters are withdrawing 
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into the apathy that characterises the entire opposition in the face of 
Fidesz’s overwhelming election victory, most DK supporters remain 
undaunted. Time is both a boon and a challenge for Gyurcsány. The 
former prime minister is still hoping that as Fidesz’s abuses grow and 
the memory of his own government’s policy failures fades, he will 
become a less divisive figure. At the same time, the typical DK voter 
is above 60, and like the Socialists, the former prime minister has not 
yet found a way to engage young people. 
 
LMP
By most accounts, the green party Politics Can be Different (LMP) is 
in the worst mess. The most dramatic change since the election has 
occurred in LMP, which has successfully divested itself of the former 
party leaders who had managed to reel in a strong performance in 
April, when LMP won 7% in a high turnout environment that tends 
to be more challenging for small parties. Rather than celebrating 
PM candidate Bernadett Szél and party co-chair Ákos Hadházy, the 
party’s Jacobite ethics commission punished them for their efforts 
at coordinating with other opposition parties, which flaunted the 
party’s official line of non-cooperation. The party’s anti-cooperation 
wing got its revenge as both Hadházy and Szél have quit LMP. 
Retrospectively, voters were less happy with LMP’s intransigence 
concerning electoral cooperation, which many on the left blame for 
Fidesz’s renewed two-thirds victory. Even LMP’s own base appears 
positively punitive about the internal strife that has characterised 
the party since the election. Suspicions abound in particular about 
the role of the billionaire Péter Ungár, who is a key party strategist 
and is working on putting together a media empire. His mother, Mária 
Schmidt, is a key Orbán loyalist, and the admission by LMP party 
manager Erzsébet Schmuck that she had consulted with Schmidt 
during the election cast a dark cloud over the party’s campaign. 
Even though LMP quickly resolved the leadership crisis by electing 
the pragmatic right winger László Lóránt Keresztes as its new leader 
along with the former MSZP politician Márta Demeter. Initially, 
Demeter had trouble even getting her membership application 
approved, but she did not face much opposition in her quest to become 
the party’s co-chair. While the internal conflicts have subsided for the 
time being, they have left a deep scar: LMP now stands at 3% among 
likely voters, less than half its April total. Although the party is talking 
a lot about a strategic partnership with Jobbik – which is struggling 
with its own internal conflicts and loss of support – the alliance is 
going nowhere for the time being, nor is it undergirded by a strategic 
vision that could propel the parties forwards.
 
Momentum 
After its fulminant entry into politics in 2017, Momentum was 
auspiciously silent in the aftermath of the election, despite achieving 
its strategic goal of winning sufficient votes to secure state funding 
(any result over 1%) and falling less short of the 5% threshold than 
many had anticipated. It seemed for a while that the party was 
running	out	of	steam,	and	as	the	party	chairman	András	Fekete-Győr	
admitted, there had been some internal conflicts. On the CEU issue, 
however, Momentum has been clearly the leading force among the 
Hungarian opposition parties, and the issue appeals to its core and 
target audience of young urban voters.
It seems likely now that if the liberal youngsters in Momentum (they 
recently joined the liberal ALDE party family) have sufficient stamina, 
the party will stick around and thanks to its support among young 
people it is going to become a parliamentary force. But despite its 
rising support – Momentum is now supported by 4-5% of likely 
voters, which means it would have a chance to enter parliament if 
the elections were held today – the youngest party on the left of 
Fidesz has not shattered the glass ceiling, either. Its growth is slow 
and thus far it has shown little innovation in appealing to voters 
beyond the urban intelligentsia, where it is popular among European 
and progressively-minded younger voters. Although this segment 
of the electorate is vital for the opposition, it is kind of a default 
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minimum target. Without an appeal outside the capital, Momentum 
risks becoming another party that competes with left-wing parties 
for the same set of voters whose alliance keeps losing election after 
election. 
 
The non-traditional opposition
In the meanwhile, Ákos Hadházy, the former co-chair of LMP is 
making waves after his departure from the greens by starting a 
successful signature collection campaign that is meant to show the 
breadth of social support for Hungary’s accession to the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office. Hadházy figures that collecting several 
hundred thousand signatures with scarce funding and fuelled only 
by civic engagement provides a counterpoint to the government’s 
expensive faux national consultation campaigns. Hadházy argues 
that Fidesz’s spiteful attempts at derailing the process by harassing 
him personally and blocking his access to rally venues with flimsy 
excuses show that his efforts are being noticed at the highest level. 
He is probably right about that. Although regardless of the number 
of signatures collected, Hungary’s accession to the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office is highly unlikely at this point, to say the least, 
the issue keeps Hadházy in the limelight while he is in the process 
of launching his joint movement with the conservative anti-Fidesz 
mayor	 of	 Hódmezővásárhely,	 Péter	 Márky-Zay.	 Unlike	 virtually	
anyone else in the current non-Jobbik opposition, Márky-Zay has 
proven that he can win in a rural town, which is a Fidesz stronghold 
to boot. If successful, his joint movement with Hadházy could be the 
first opposition formation since the currently faltering Jobbik to make 
a dent in Fidesz’s impregnable rural wall, which is a must for any 
opposition victory. 
Overall, along with the consistently popular antics of Hungary’s “joke 
party”, the Two-Tailed Dog Party (MKKP) – which has also slightly 
risen in the polls and stands at 3% now –, this is a rare ray of sunlight 
in what is otherwise visibly another low-point for the depressed 
Hungarian opposition. Still, there are not any promising signs yet 
of the opposition gearing up for the vital challenge of the municipal 
election in the fall of the 2019. Winning major municipalities could 
be a key step in the process of rebuilding, but it will take strong 
candidates, unity and at least a glimpse of a common vision, all of 
which are sorely lacking still. 
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2.2 Under pressure, 
Jobbik cracks  
wide open
For almost a full term of parliament, former Jobbik chairman Gábor 
Vona held together an increasingly divided and incredulous party as 
he relentlessly and resolutely shifted Jobbik away from its extremist 
image, dragging it towards moderation on most issues where Jobbik 
used to be the most polarising force in Hungarian politics. Outsiders 
mocked this process as Jobbik’s “cuteness campaign”, while Jobbik 
itself referred to it as becoming a people’s party, in other words a 
centre-right party that challenged Fidesz for control of the moderate 
centre of Hungarian politics. Seeing Vona’s strategy in a long-game 
perspective, he was essentially laying the groundwork for a scenario 
where in a crisis of public confidence Fidesz would be shedding 
voters in droves, and in that scenario the evident alternative choice 
– especially for centre-right voters – could be Jobbik.
A symbolic culmination of this improbable journey was Vona’s 
appearance at the Mecca of Budapest’s Jewish liberal intelligentsia, 
the Spinoza cultural centre during the election campaign. There, Vona 
pled the case for Jobbik to an audience that will almost certainly never 
vote for the former radicals, but which was nevertheless increasingly 
divided itself on how actively it should oppose the party in light of 
Fidesz’s increasingly authoritarian policies. No stranger to anti-
Semitic stereotypes, Vona might have figured that the audience itself 
would be influential enough to cause a political shift in his favour. At 
least to some extent it has worked: the left-liberal side is now in a 
state of uncertainty concerning its relations with Jobbik, and there 
are definitely few people left on the left at this point who think that 
Jobbik is Hungary’s biggest problem.  Whatever remains of leftwing 
media in Hungary, the visceral rejection of Jobbik is gone, replaced 
mostly by cluelessness. 
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Seemingly unified in the campaign
More interesting than the outside reaction, however, was the party 
itself. Jobbik behaved like the ruling party it has generally sought to 
imitate: even though everyone assumed that it must be rumbling 
within the party, stunningly little of this manifested itself publicly. By 
and large, the motley assortment of radicals that had enthusiastically 
carried the anti-Roma and anti-Jewish message that had framed the 
rise of Jobbik supported Vona’s course of radical moderation, at least 
in public. 
Interestingly, until the 2018 parliamentary elections this included the 
party’s most prominent radical, László Toroczkai, who had risen to 
eminence for his role as an organiser of the violent anti-Gyurcsány 
demonstration in 2006. Toroczkai has cultivated his status as a 
hardliner in his capacity as the mayor of the village of Ásotthalom, 
where he organised a paramilitary unit of “migrant hunters” to help 
enforce the official policy of keeping refugees out of Hungary. That 
Toroczkai and fellow hardliners, such as MP Dóra Dúró were not all 
too happy with Vona’s direction was widely assumed, but – as they 
rightly pointed out since the intraparty divisions burst out into the 
open – they remained quiet and rarely strayed from the party line.
 
Actually divided
Once the election results were in, however, the situation changed 
quickly. It was clear that just like in 2014, when our analysis at the time 
noted that Jobbik felt oddly downtrodden after a fairly impressive 
election result, chairman and PM-candidate Gábor Vona had set the 
bar far too high. He said that short of an election victory, he would 
resign as party leader. Few people took this pledge seriously. In the 
end, it was assumed, Jobbik would fall far short of this unrealistic 
objective but improve sufficiently over its 2014 result to justify 
Vona’s pivot to the centre, forcing him to bow to popular pressure in 
the party and stay on as the head of a substantially increased faction 
in parliament.
But the actual results cast a different light on Vona’s strategy. With 
Fidesz’s extremely successful mobilisation and a brutal negative 
campaign against Jobbik that often included fake-news about Vona, 
Jobbik received a slightly lower share of the votes than in 2014 
despite the fact that it increased its actual number of voters. By most 
standards – but especially the excessively inflated ones set by Vona 
– the election result was thus a flop. Jobbik has only three more MPs 
than in 2014, about 13% of the seats overall, and it dropped slightly 
from 20.7% to 19.8% of the votes (among Hungarians voting in Hungary 
proper, thus not counting ethnic Hungarian dual citizens across the 
border, over 95% (216,000) of whom support Fidesz). All but one of 
its single-district candidates lost, including Vona and the other major 
party figures, even in districts where their chances were regarded as 
decent (especially in northeastern Hungary, where Jobbik is popular 
with large segments of the formerly leftwing anti-Fidesz voters). 
Nevertheless, disappointing though it may be, it would have been 
possible to put a slightly more positive spin on these results. First of all, 
Jobbik clearly finished second and became the strongest opposition 
party in the Parliament. And although that is small consolation for 
its low vote share, it also increased the number of its voters by ca. 
70,000. Most importantly, however, it is now for the first time ahead 
of the total vote count of the parties that constitute what Jobbik (and 
some other formations) refers to as the “old left”, namely MSZP and 
DK, whose combined share of the vote had been well ahead of Jobbik 
in 2014. Although he was not quite as devastating in his assessment 
as he had been in 2014, Vona still did not make a major effort to sell 
the election result as a partial success. While he alluded to some of 
the fact above, he stuck to the point that the election was lost and 
that he was done as chairman, and later as a politician altogether.
 
Leadership battle
That was the signal that the seething resentment that had 
accumulated on the far-right over his political course could be aired. 
Toroczkai wrote immediately on Facebook that he had swallowed 
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his frustration long enough, now Vona’s ideas were done and his 
resignation could not be one of the usual farcical withdrawals where 
the politician is immediately asked by the party to step back up. The 
public media, which generally eschews Jobbik politicians as it does 
with all representatives of the opposition, was glad to give Toroczkai 
and other radicals a platform. 
The Vona loyalists in the party put up a leadership duo to succeed 
Vona. The former skinhead Tamás Sneider was nominated to lead 
the	 party,	 and	 Márton	 Gyöngyösi,	 who	 became	 infamous	 for	 his	
demand to list Jews in parliament (which he later claimed to have 
phrased poorly, as he allegedly called for a list of Israeli-Hungarian 
dual citizens), was selected to be his deputy. In any case, despite 
their	 controversial	 activities	 in	 the	 past,	 Sneider	 and	 Gyöngyösi	
unequivocally committed themselves to the policy line set by Vona. 
 
Back to the roots – Toroczkai sets up Our 
Homeland
Toroczkai was clearly aware that letting such a huge minority lie 
fallow would be a wasted opportunity. Following the Jobbik congress, 
he attempted to set up a platform within the party to “return the 
party to the ideology laid out in its founding deed”. However, the 
Jobbik leadership immediately nipped the proposal in the bud, making 
it clear that Toroczkai would not have any political future inside the 
party. 
Subsequently, the Hungarian political scene was enriched by another 
far-right party. Mi hazánk mozgalom (Our Homeland Movement) is 
mainly formed by ex-Jobbik members, who were disappointed with 
the new path of the party and “want to go back to its radical roots”. 
Dúró summarized the newly formed party’s core values by stating 
that “Instead of the confusing Rainbow flag, we want the Hungarian 
tricolor”. Her statement was strengthened by Toroczkai who 
proclaimed that Hungary should remain a “white island” in Europe.
For the emerging new far-right movement, there are also strategic 
dilemmas. Despite an eagerness to air their grievances on the 
Fidesz-controlled public media, the radicals in Our Homeland must 
also be cautious not to appear too cosy with the government. After 
all, they all have argued that Fidesz is bad for Hungary and the voters 
who stuck with Jobbik at the elections – moderates and radicals alike 
– tend to believe that as well. 
 
An accelerated alliance?
While it is not yet clear how successful Toroczkai’s new party can be 
in the future (currently it stands at 1-2% in the polls), and Jobbik still 
needs to find its voice after the resignation of Vona, Fidesz continues 
to crack down on Jobbik. Given the exorbitant 600-million-HUF fine 
that Jobbik received from the State Audit Office in 2017, it was no 
surprise when Jobbik announced it was not competing in local by-
elections in Budapest in 2018. The party, thus the statement, did not 
have sufficient funds to run a campaign. 
On the one hand, it is true that the largest opposition party in Hungary 
is in dire financial straits and can ill-afford to compete in an election 
that it is bound to lose, for Jobbik is not competitive in Budapest. Still, 
one could also read into this decision a more deliberate choice not 
to spoil an opposition victory that might very well hinge on Jobbik 
voters. If that reading is correct, it is an offer on the table for next 
year’s municipal election. The left could in turn sit out elections in 
areas where Jobbik is more competitive, thereby increasing the 
number of municipalities where there is only one major opposition 
candidate in the race. 
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The Hungarian opposition is in worse shape at the end of 2018 than 
it was before the parliamentary elections. The overall support of 
the opposition has further decreased since April 2018 as both the 
leftwing and liberal side of the political spectrum and the radical right 
have lost voters. At the same time, the proportion of non-voters and 
the support of Fidesz have gone up. Following the third consecutive 
electoral defeat, all opposition players are aware that the way they 
have done politics in the last two terms cannot go on anymore, and 
opposition politics should be rebuilt completely. It has also become 
a commonplace that without media and infrastructure in rural 
Hungary, even the best policy proposals and sound bites (and also, 
the biggest corruption scandals) cannot reach beyond the big urban 
centres. However, there are only very few signs that the opposition 
parties could address these fundamental problems in the coming 
years. 
Moreover, a Policy Solutions research on “Social democratic values in 
Hungary” has indicated that the fundamental problem is not the level 
of support for social democratic values and policy proposals, but the 
credibility of parties located on the left-liberal side of the Hungarian 
party system. Therefore, one of the greatest strategic challenges for 
the left-liberal opposition in the next few years will be to associate 
with themselves the popular social democratic issues, and persuade 
voters that they represent these issues in the most credible way. The 
figures indicate that this will not happen if left-wing parties cannot 
persuade people who voted for Fidesz or Jobbik in 2018, and who 
even regard these parties as the most credible representatives of 
leftist values. 
The economic and social policies of the Orbán government provide 
a good opportunity for the opposition to put redistribution, labour 
rights, the access to public services (and the quality of them) in 
the focus of their politics in the 2018-2022 parliamentary term. It 
must be added that in a political environment where xenophobia, 
nationalism and conspiracy theories have high mobilisation potential, 
regaining left-wing credibility concerning economic and social topics 
is not in itself necessarily a guarantee for a win at the elections. 
However, it can be concluded without doubt that if left-wing parties 
cannot recover their credibility in the key pillars of their identity, there 
is no chance of establishing a viable alternative against the Fidesz-
government.
There will be two major elections in 2019, but from a long-term 
perspective the local elections will be even more important than 
the European elections. For the Hungarian opposition, the local 
elections will provide the last chance before the 2022 parliamentary 
elections to gain some ground (and much needed financial resources) 
in Hungarian municipalities. While at the EP elections there will 
be no pressure on the individual parties to cooperate, given the 
proportional election system, uniting forces for the local elections 
will be a must. Huge debates among the opposition parties about the 
exact format of cooperation and the nomination of candidates are 
all but guaranteed for 2019, but if they are unable to overcome their 
differences and field a single candidate in each place, they certainly 
will not have a chance to perform better than any time in the last 
eight years. The increasingly aggressive and authoritarian politics of 
the governing party may prove to be helpful in helping the opposition 
parties to put aside their differences.  
At the European elections, MSZP-Párbeszéd and DK seem certain to 
win seats, while the freefall of LMP since the parliamentary elections 
suggests that Hungary’s green party might end up below the 5% 
threshold. The Hungarian Macronists, Momentum can potentially 
benefit from LMP’s loss of support and enter the European 
2.3  Outlook on the Hungarian opposition in 2019
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Parliament, but it also depends on how seriously the Hungarian Two-
tailed Dog Party, a “joke party”, takes the elections (both parties race 
for the same young, highly qualified, urban voting group). Similarly 
to LMP, Jobbik has also been going down in the polls since April. 
The radical right party has lost a third of its voters and is likely to 
perform worse at the EP elections than they did at the parliamentary 
elections.      
Much about Jobbik is in doubt and in flux now, what is clear however 
is that the recent series of events (the split of the far-right opposition) 
massively benefits the governing party, which appears to have 
floored its most dangerous opponent for the time being. Assuming 
some type of democratic election, an electoral alliance between 
Jobbik and the centre-left is one of the few realistic scenarios for 
ousting Fidesz. On the one hand, a more moderate Jobbik could send 
the party on a faster pathway towards an electoral alliance with the 
left. At the same time, it would deprive that alliance of a key segment 
of the core Jobbik electorate. In any case, if such a coordination works 
well in terms of capturing municipal assemblies and mayoralties – 
and previous experience has shown that it can work – then Fidesz 
will have three years to prepare for such a scenario in 2022. It would 
be unusual if the governing party did not have a response ready by 
that time.
Another Policy Solutions study (“Democracy and Hungarian Society”) 
published recently about the perceptions of the quality of democracy 
in Hungary showed that there is a lack of faith in the power of 
parliamentary elections among the supporters of the opposition. 
There are parallel reality perceptions in Hungarian society with 
respect to the sense of the quality of democracy, but outside the 
majority of government party voters, no one (undecideds included) 
believes that all is well with respect to the state of Hungarian 
democracy. 
This confronts the opposition parties with a major challenge. In this 
situation, the most pressing questions are no longer only what types 
of issues can be deployed most effectively to attack Fidesz; what 
issues are best suited for coming up with an attractive opposition 
alternative; or in what type of alliance system the opposition parties 
ought to compete in the election. At the same time, they also need to 
convince the frustrated potential voters that voting is making sense 
at all. The first and biggest challenge facing the opposition parties in 
the next elections is the pervasive and deep sense of apathy among 
their potential voters, the widespread impression that Fidesz cannot 
be defeated at the ballot box. This is of course fuelled in part by the 
crisis in the credibility of the opposition parties, but the problems run 
deeper still: the loss of confidence now also extends to the institution 
of democratic elections as such. If the loss of confidence of the voters 
(and especially the potential opposition voters) in the democratic 
elections persists and results in a lower propensity to vote, then that 
will only serve to improve Fidesz’s chances of reaffirming its hold on 
power in election after election. 
The big question for 2019 – the year of European and local elections 
– is whether the continuous decline in the state of democracy 
will trigger greater activity among voters who are critical of the 
government or whether it will result in a combination of resignation 
and passivity.
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3.1  Orbán’s battle 
for Europe
Viktor Orbán’s ambitions for a greater role in European politics were 
among the least guarded secrets in Hungary. In 2018, however, it 
became clearer than ever that Orbán wants to be in the vanguard of 
a movement reshaping the European Union. 
His	annual	speech	to	ethnic	Hungarians	in	the	town	of	Tusnádfürdő	
(Romania) took a panoramic view of international affairs, touching on 
a variety of regions near (the central European region, Russia) and 
far (China, the US). The speech also contained an outline of a historic 
mission, which went further than previous criticisms of the European 
elite. Until then, the point was for Brussels to lay off, to let Hungary 
be, whether in relation to the government’s efforts to streamline the 
media or its refusal to admit any refugees. In 2018, Orbán went further 
and said that the “liberal” powers which dominate the European 
Parliament and the European Commission are “unfit” to lead and that 
their days are numbered: they would be ousted at the EP election in 
2019. According to the Hungarian PM, to save Europe, which was 
“once a great civilisation”, the “multicultural”, “anti-democratic” 
elite in Brussels would need to be replaced by a conservative, anti-
immigration and family values-oriented movement. 
This is a vital moment. For Orbán, the goal is no longer to keep the EU 
out of domestic Hungarian affairs, it is to subject it to Orbán’s vision; 
not to get the EU leadership to finally leave him (Hungary, as he terms 
it) alone but to replace them with people like Orbán. The reason why 
we believe that this statement should be taken more seriously than a 
simple political declaration is that the prime minister himself portrays 
this as an epic struggle to save Europe. This is supposedly a historical 
moment in which a saviour needs to come along to lead the troops 
into battle for survival. 
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A martial mindset applied to Europe
One could call this grandiose, but two things are important to keep in 
mind. One, Orbán’s vision of politics has been one of warfare for a long 
time. He has openly described his attitude towards domestic politics 
in martial terms – either the enemy is destroyed or they destroy us, 
there is no room for compromise or peaceful coexistence, one must 
either endure being dominated or outright destroyed or subject the 
“enemy” to eternal submission. 
It may be tempting to belittle the rhetorical extremism because the 
battle cries sound like communication ploys to energise Orbán’s 
supporters. At the same time, however, based on previous experience 
it seems that he does not view this as mere rhetoric. In Hungarian 
politics, where he has embraced this mindset, he has indeed 
transformed the broader political framework according to this dark 
vision. His vanquished enemies in domestic politics have been nearly 
completely disarmed, they are kept under complete control, subject 
to ongoing threats by a variety of means, including both regulatory 
and unofficial harassment. 
This is not to suggest that Orbán can do this to the European 
institutional framework, but it is important to be aware of what 
the goal and the rules of engagement are for the Hungarian prime 
minister. Especially so since – and this is the second point that 
Orbán’s European opponents need to keep in mind – within the 
span of a few years the Hungarian prime minister has gone from a 
miserable position as the EU’s isolated outcast to an influential figure 
with a growing set of allies, partners and acolytes. 
 
The spread of Orbánism 
The refugee crisis has completely transformed the situation, 
shifting the prevailing view of Orbán as a pariah to that of a genuine 
competitor on the European scene who offers one of the most 
compelling narratives of European politics at this time. In terms of 
understanding the causal dynamic, it is important to note that it was 
not his closeness to Russia or his authoritarian consolidation of power 
that has legitimised his discourse and policies towards refugees and 
migrants, but the other way round. The broad popular appeal of his 
anti-migrant stance is making a growing number of European voters 
and leaders gloss over what they might otherwise see as unpalatable 
or even unacceptable, anti-democratic aspects of his policies. 
Since 2015, Orbán’s friends, allies and copycats have proliferated both 
in the ranks of governing parties as well as among major opposition 
parties. Friendly governments who share all or major parts of Orbán’s 
controversial agenda rule in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Austria and Italy. In the meanwhile, Orbán-
friendly far-right opposition parties have gained substantially in 
strength in France, the Netherlands and Germany, among others. 
 
Splitting the conservative movement
For years, there were two European debates concerning Orbán. One 
was how to rein Fidesz in, how to compel it to return to the European 
consensus on democracy and Russia in particular. The other issue 
was whether, failing that, Orbán’s Fidesz can remain a member in 
good standing of the largest political bloc in the EU, the centre-right 
European People’s Party, even though its policy preferences are no 
longer a fit for the conservative-liberal group. Neither debate has 
been completely settled, but as for the first, it is clear that the EU’s 
instruments are limited as a growing number of Orbán allies and 
sympathisers in the European Council render successful concerted 
action against the Fidesz government highly unlikely. 
In the meanwhile, Orbán is bent on turning the tables on his detractors 
within the EPP. Although conservative critics from several western 
countries have called for ousting Fidesz from the conservative 
group, powerful allies, in particular some influential German, Italian 
and French conservatives, have shielded Fidesz despite the obvious 
incompatibility of his views and policies with mainstream European 
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conservative thought, and the crossing of various “red lines” (most 
recently on the CEU issue). His allies have stood by Orbán even though 
it is increasingly obvious that Fidesz is more sympathetic to far-right 
parties that compete with its formal centre-right allies, from Marine 
Le Pen’s National Rally in France, over Geert Wilders’ PVV and the 
Lega in Italy, all the way to the AfD in Germany. The pro-government 
media in Hungary – tightly controlled by the Fidesz headquarters 
– openly laud far-right electoral successes and they constantly 
complain about centre-right politicians. In the EP debate about the 
Sargentini report, the MEPs of the above mentioned far-right parties 
referred to Viktor Orbán as a “European hero” for standing up against 
migration, and besides their clear sympathies, some of them offered 
future cooperation under the flag of “Europe of Nations”.
 
The Orbán-EU clash of the year – The 
Sargentini report 
On 12 September 2018 the European Parliament voted to trigger the 
Article 7 procedure against Hungary, calling on EU member states to 
examine the state of Hungary’s democracy, warning there is a “clear 
risk” of breaching EU values by the government of Viktor Orbán. The 
move was adopted by two-thirds of MEPs, 448 for, 197 against 
and with 48 abstentions. The Sargentini report cited a wide array 
of violations of EU democracy standards, including allegations that 
Orbán’s government has restricted the freedoms of expression, press 
and association, and undermined the functioning of the constitutional 
and electoral systems and the independence of the judiciary. The 
adoption of the report seemed likely already after the debate at the 
EP plenary session, as Orbán confirmed that he would not back down 
on controversial laws (including the ones on NGOs and the Central 
European University). Orbán also criticised the EPP strongly. The 
Hungarian PM stressed that he saw the EPP „weak”, a party group 
that „lost character” and that in his opinion, they are followers of the 
Socialists and the Liberals rather than trend-setters in European 
politics. The unwillingness to compromise led the majority of EPP and 
even its leader, Manfred Weber to vote for the Sargentini report.
Being aware of the fact that previous verbal fights at the European 
political scene have boosted his popularity among his likely voters, 
Orbán decided to address MEPs in Strasbourg, during the debate of 
the report. In the run up to the debate, pro-government media labelled 
the document a „Soros-report” and claimed that the document was 
„full of lies” and that it was a „revenge” for Orbán’s migration policies. 
Despite the obvious tensions within the largest European party 
family, until this point Orbán’s protectors in the EPP have managed 
to convince wavering MEPs to keep Fidesz in by arguing that the 
only result of losing the large faction of Fidesz MEP’s would be a loss 
of control over Orbán, who might well take a swifter path towards 
disassembling democracy in Hungary and fling the door even further 
open to Putin’s influence in Europe. However, it is clear that while the 
EPP expects the Hungarian prime minister to show some openness 
to make compromises, Orbán shows no signs of backing down and 
handles any criticism towards his government as “insults against the 
honor of the Hungarian nation”.
 
Towards a new right?
Although the departure of Fidesz from the EPP group is off the table 
at least until the EP elections in May 2019, a break between Orbán 
and the EPP potentially holds out the prospect of the formation of 
a new and large parliamentary group in the next term, consisting of 
rightwing populist parties in the EP, spanning a variety of Eurosceptic 
parties from the AfD in Germany, the Lega in Italy, the National Front 
in France all the way to Fidesz. Depending on whether the strong 
polling for these parties persists into 2019 and how many parties it 
can successfully integrate, it might become the second or third largest 
faction in the EP. If he chose to get behind it, Orbán would of course 
be a vital player in forging such a cooperation, as he is held in high 
esteem by radicals across Europe, and the notion of adding a leading 
governing party (most likely along with the Polish PiS, at least) is of 
course alluring to the populists. For the EPP, as well as for the other 
mainstream parties, a large, organised and coherent Eurosceptic 
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faction is a major threat. This threat is obviously not attributable 
to Orbán alone, and in fact it may materialise even without his 
cooperation. But everyone is now aware that he views himself as a 
potentially vital player in such a series of events and it is also clear 
that this prospect has emerged as a key instrument to blackmail his 
existing allies among the EU’s mainstream conservatives. Not only 
is Orbán indicating that he is no longer willing to brook any pressure 
on domestic issues, he is sending a clear message that he wants the 
EPP to adapt to his reactionary vision of society rather than the other 
way round. 
 
It’s all about Germany
The fault line on the Orbán issue goes straight through Germany, 
where the mainstream conservative parties are increasingly 
internally divided. Angela Merkel’s fairly liberal course on the refugee 
question and other areas, too, is a source of major friction between 
her CDU party and its Bavarian sister organisation, the CSU; but 
even within her own CDU, Merkel’s conservative critics are unhappy 
with the centrist imprint of her long chancellorship. The German 
conservatives are constantly trying to skirt the Orbán issue and they 
are undoubtedly the most important players in terms of deciding how 
to react to Orbán’s challenge of the European centre-right, but for the 
time being they appear too divided to handle this problem. 
Enter Macron
Most of the enemies that Orbán has selected over the years turned 
down the opportunity to engage. Not so the French president. During 
Orbán’s meeting with his most recent influential ally, Italian minister 
of the interior Matteo Salvini, the duo openly challenged French 
president Emmanuel Macron, arguing that “he leads the European 
force that backs migration, and on the other side there’s us who 
want to stop illegal migration”. Of all Orbán’s foreign nemeses thus 
far, Macron proved most willing to pick up the gauntlet, retorting 
immediately that if Orbán and Salvini “want to see me as their 
main opponent, they are right,” saying that he would not “cede any 
ground to nationalists and those who advocate hate speech.” The 
French president, who (somewhat similar to Orbán) sees himself in 
the historic role of having to save Europe and is thus pushing for a 
comprehensive reform of the EU, including greater fiscal integration, 
appears to be the first international actor of stature who is not willing 
to let Orbán’s provocations slide (pointedly, the pro-Orbán French 
ambassador was recalled after his ringing endorsements of the 
Hungarian prime minister were leaked to the press).
The past year has made it clearer than ever before that the Hungarian 
prime minister has ambitions beyond Hungary, and his most recent 
statements on the issue are clearly no longer intended just for 
domestic consumption, even if his home audience is always likely to 
remain his chief concern. But he is a European player now, and he 
appears tempted to test the limits of his strength in the European 
arena. 
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The election of Donald Trump as US president was supposed to 
be the ultimate dream come true for Viktor Orbán’s foreign policy 
approach: his once impossible-seeming juggling act of nurturing 
very close ties with Russian president Vladimir Putin while 
remaining a member in good standing of the western community 
in the broadest possible terms – both economically (EU) and in 
terms of security policy (NATO) – was within arm’s reach. In 2016, 
Orbán effectively endorsed Trump and celebrated his victory as 
the event that allowed Hungary to reclaim its full independence. 
Independence in this context meant that he was allowed to pursue 
a pro-Russian and pro-Chinese foreign policy while maintaining his 
formal allegiance to EU/NATO. 
Yet, despite these lofty expectations initially nothing changed in 
US-Hungarian relations. This was due to a combination of factors, 
including legacy policies and a chaotic transition under Trump. 
Although he never commented publicly, Orbán has been long 
rumoured to be unhappy with the lack of positive attention from the 
Trump administration, which stood especially in marked contrast to 
the effusive praise heaped by the new president on strongmen in 
Russia and Turkey, for example. Ultimately, it may not have been 
the deliberate brush-off that the leftwing media read into it. Major 
parts of the US president’s conservative administration do not 
necessarily share his foreign policy preferences, and Trump’s own 
limited attention hardly extends to a small country such as Hungary. 
Erdogan and Putin are major players internationally; Orbán simply 
does not rank on the same scale. 
A new US ambassador
So the best hope for Orbán was that sooner or later a Trump-
appointed ambassador would arrive and take control of the embassy. 
However, it took a year and a half since Trump’s inauguration for the 
ambassador nominated by Trump, the New York businessman David 
Cornstein, to finally assume his position in Budapest. Cornstein 
started out promising enough from the Hungarian government’s 
perspective, heaping fulsome praise on Hungary already in 
September and telling the Jewish magazine Szombat in an interview 
that not only was everything fine with democracy in Hungary, but in 
fact he had not met a single person who was dissatisfied with the 
way things are working in this country. Nevertheless, despite his 
overall satisfaction the ambassador also made clear that the US 
policy on the Central European University (CEU) – the Budapest-
based institution of higher education founded by George Soros that 
the Orbán government sought to expel from Hungary – has not 
changed: the US stands firmly behind CEU in the latter’s efforts to 
stay in the Hungarian capital.
This clear commitment was somewhat of a positive surprise for the 
opposition-aligned intelligentsia, which found few other rays of hope 
in Cornstein’s pronouncements. It seemed that the US assessment, 
which Cornstein’s repeated statements on the matter unequivocally 
conveyed, was that regardless of party politics, the institution clearly 
adds to the American influence in the region, and thus its net impact 
makes its preservation vital for US interests. The Central European 
University has also enjoyed strong bipartisan support on Capitol 
Hill, with representatives of both parties warning that ejecting the 
school would undercut academic freedom and harm US-Hungarian 
relations.
3.2  Hungary’s foreign policy in global context
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A failed strategy
However, by the end of November it became clear that the Hungarian 
government would not change its mind because of some positive 
comments from the US ambassador on the state of democracy in 
Hungary. Orbán ignored the American requests and snubbed the 
ambassador’s attempts to mediate a deal on CEU. When CEU’s self-
imposed deadline (1 December) approached and it seemed inevitable 
that the university would move its core operations to Vienna, 
Cornstein made an about-face on the issue, and claimed that CEU’s 
departure was really George Soros’ fault. In an interview with the 
Washington Post, the US ambassador declined to directly criticise 
Orbán – whom he described as his “friend” – and instead blamed 
Soros for not cultivating better relations with Orbán. Cornstein also 
downplayed the university’s importance, and added that this affair 
“doesn’t have anything to do with academic freedom”. Of course, 
these statements contradicted previous statements from the United 
States, which have cast the university’s fate as a matter of principle. 
As CEU ends up leaving, the big question is how will that impact 
Hungarian-US relations? Orbán has not felt the love from the US 
government for long, but his decision to force CEU out of Hungary 
suggests that he would not mind losing it again quickly. Orbán’s 
behaviour has also been a strong indicator of how emboldened 
and self-confident the Hungarian PM has become after his third 
consecutive election victory. He has apparently realised that the 
current ability and willingness of western powers to interfere with 
him are rather small. This is also underlined by the fact that the 
Hungarian government has ignored another US request when it 
extradited weapon smugglers to Russia instead of the US after 
they were captured with the help of American drug crime officers, 
according to a report by the Direkt36 investigative site.   
The trajectory of US ambassadors serving in Hungary during Orbán’s 
government has been one of high hopes and praise morphing into 
disappointment and recriminations after a while. This was the case 
with both Colleen Bell and her predecessor Eleni Kounalakis, who 
both started out with an eagerness to understand and accommodate 
Orbán if at all possible, and ended up deeply disappointed and highly 
critical of his government. Yet Bell and Kounalakis were at the same 
time appointees of a Democratic administration whose foreign policy 
was deeply inimical to Orbán’s domestic and international agenda. 
This kind of incompatibility between the respective policies of the 
Hungarian and US policy no longer prevails, at least for the time being. 
Still, both Trump and Orbán are politicians who are governed far more 
by momentary interests than by long-term commitments of any kind, 
and as a result the future trajectory of their relationships will always 
depend on temporary factors rather than considerations involving 
strategy or principle. What’s more – and this is not necessarily 
a situation that’s unique to the Orbán government but a general 
characteristic of Hungarian foreign policy – to a substantial extent it 
will depend on a variety of factors that are outside of Orbán’s control. 
If Trump and Putin end up being at odds about some issue, however, 
then the point when Orbán has to choose between its western allies 
and Russia might finally arrive.
 
Openly committed to the East now
What is less difficult to predict these days is which side Viktor Orbán 
would choose in the event of such a tension. The Hungarian prime 
minister has openly hitched his wagon to Putin, and he has made 
clear that Hungarywants even stronger links with the East, primarily 
with Russia but also other authoritarian non-western regimes, 
especially Turkey and China. Given Hungary’s economic integration in 
western economic and security structures, this clearly runs counter 
to the country’s strategic interests, but Orbán’s private interests, to 
which national policies are increasingly subordinated, will override 
the concerns about turning against the West.
As the threat of losing EU funds after 2020 is increasingly likely, 
there can be an economic explanation of the turn towards eastern 
powers. When it comes to new external sources for money, given 
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their economic size and proven interest to invest in the region, 
Russia, China and Turkey are the best targets. However, it can be 
also argued that reaching out to the “strongmen” is an instrument to 
raise Orbán’s profile. The fact that he has been doing this against the 
wishes and policies of the EU and the US, and has been able to do so 
unpunished, could be seen as a major strategy to raise his weight on 
the international stage.
Orbán’s political alliance with Putin is as deep and as opaque as 
ever. Even though they skipped the “tradition” of meeting early 
in the year in 2018 – no doubt also to avoid burdening Orbán’s re-
election campaign with the Russia issue, which does not quite sit 
right even with a segment of the pro-Fidesz base – they met twice 
after the general elections. As usual, the Hungarian public has not 
been apprised of what they discussed and it would be pointless to 
speculate. Apart from energy cooperation, and in particular the 
Paks nuclear plant expansion, neither the bilateral economic ties nor 
any other major policy aspects show major signs of improvement. 
What remains intense are business ties between some oligarchs 
associated with the Orbán government and Russian businesses, as 
well as the entanglement of Fidesz officials in the visa scheme that 
has given many wealthy foreigners access to EU residency, including 
shady characters in Russia who probably enjoy the backing of the 
Putin administration.
What is becoming more apparent is that the Hungarian government is 
willing to make certain foreign policy decisions even if they come at the 
price of losing credibility in the eyes of EU and NATO partners. A prime 
example has been the case of former Macedonian prime minister 
Nikola Gruevski, convicted for corruption in his country, who has been 
given asylum by the Hungarian authorities after he had managed to 
escape through several countries in the Western Balkans with the 
help of Hungarian diplomats. Since the official Western Balkans 
policy of Hungary has been the support of Euro-Atlantic integration 
of these countries for decades, the Hungarian government’s 
decision to help out the fellow strongman of the Hungarian PM is 
impossible to be explained on the basis of Hungarian foreign policy 
interests. The fact that Hungary has been blocking Ukraine’s Euro-
Atlantic integration because of a dispute over Ukraine’s controversial 
education law also raises questions among Hungary’s NATO allies. As 
long as the West can or will not make Orbán a more attractive offer 
or will not  find ways of pressuring him more effectively, Hungary’s 
strategic commitment to the East will prevail.
It must be also added that Orbán’s strategy to reach out to the ethnic 
Hungarian minorities of neighbouring countries is apparently fulfilling 
a number of political functions. Besides reducing the shortage on the 
Hungarian labour market and providing the governing party with 
loyal new voters, this strategy has created from scratch a remarkable 
political leverage towards the US, NATO and EU as well, particularly 
when it comes to relationships with Ukraine. Reaching out to the 
ethnic Hungarian communities also goes down well with nationalist 
voters, and has provided an advantage to Fidesz over Jobbik for many 
years. 
 
Loving Erdogan, too
This is also manifest in Orbán’s assiduous courting of fellow 
strongman Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Turkey. Although 
this messes with his general approach to foreign policy goals, the 
specific interests at stake are even less apparent than with respect 
to Russia. According to Hungarian newspapers, Orbán was the first 
to congratulate Erdogan on his election victory, and along with 
the prime minister of Bulgaria, Orbán was the only EU leader who 
attended Erdogan’s inauguration in July. In October, Orbán welcomed 
the Turkish president with pomp and circumstances, though their 
meeting yielded few concrete results. 
Nevertheless, apart from the similarities in their approach towards 
governing, especially with respect to suppressing dissent and 
capturing independent institutions, these politicians are also 
being pulled together by their desire to forge new alliances in an 
international environment that has left them at odds with their 
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nations’ traditional partners. As Erdogan’s aggressively assertive 
foreign policy is making him increasingly isolated, at this moment 
new partners are more urgent for him than for Orbán, who has 
successfully shed his pariah status in the EU and has become 
somewhat of a celebrity among central and eastern Europeans as 
well as on western Europe’s far-right. 
Like Putin, Erdogan benefits from a foot in the door in Europe, and 
increasingly any friend with whom there are no grounds for conflict. 
Yet, even though Orbán fits the bill, he is not particularly relevant to 
Turkey’s global aspirations, and despite Orbán’s friendly overtures, 
the Hungarian partnership is unlikely to play a significant role in 
Turkish foreign policy. 
 
A willing ally for everyone who’s powerful?
Finally, as part of his eastern opening the Hungarian prime minister is 
also aggressively courting the People’s Republic of China, still trying 
to cast Hungary as China’s economic and diplomatic bridgehead in 
the European Union, much the same role that Orbán already plays 
for Russia. The Hungarian prime minister’s rhetoric also indicates 
that while his political ties to Russia may be stronger – owing also 
to Russia’s more direct influence and interest in the region – the 
Chinese economic model is more relevant for his vision of Hungary’s 
future. He has lauded the Asian attitude towards work and his view 
of economic growth is rooted in the idea of Hungary serving as an 
assembly line of western high-tech products, especially automobiles. 
Orbán understands that the Chinese government is sensitive to 
international criticisms – as authoritarian regimes tend to be in 
general, only more so. Just in April the Hungarian government 
effectively vetoed a joint statement by the EU protesting China’s 
Silk Road project because the latter “runs counter to the EU agenda 
for liberalizing trade and pushes the balance of power in favour 
of subsidized Chinese companies.” Ultimately, the statement 
was adopted at the ambassadorial level, where 27 of the 28 EU 
ambassadors accredited to Beijing signed it, while their Hungarian 
colleague refused. This is a reflection of Orbán’s self-understanding 
as a partner who asks no question as long as bilateral dealings are 
mutually beneficial. The isolation of Hungary on this issue highlights 
that there are situations when Orbán’s international approach is too 
controversial even in countries whose leaders broadly sympathise 
with his views. 
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There are indications that 2019 could become a genuine watershed 
moment for Fidesz’s foreign policy and Hungary’s western 
integration. In 2018, Viktor Orbán made clearer than ever before that 
he has made Hungary a part of an informal but firm alliance around 
Russia. As far as Hungary’s formal western allies are concerned, 
Orbán has also emphatically made clear that he supports far-right 
movements in their countries that challenge the political status quo, 
their countries’ position vis-à-vis the European Union. Some of these 
parties also share Orbán’s dubious understanding of democracy. 
In a continuous tug of war, Orbán and the mainstream conservative 
European People’s Party are trying to ascertain if they mutually 
have a place for another. Although both sides have agreed that 
they will put the controversial issues – most importantly that of 
Fidesz’s EPP membership – off for the time being, in reality this 
is a concession only by the EPP. Orbán has not flinched in ignoring 
the “red line” previously set by the EPP’s parliamentary leader and 
candidate to the lead the European Commission, Manfred Weber, 
who said that the party group would tolerate neither the expulsion 
of the Central European University from Hungary nor the legally 
enshrined harassment of NGOs, both of which are happening 
nevertheless. 
The European elections in May 2019 will decide which way this plays 
out. It is up to European voters to shuffle the deck that will decide the 
hand each player will be dealt in the difficult bargaining situation that 
will follow from the EP election. For the EPP, the situation will not 
be easy: without Orbán the EPP will lose a painful number of MEPs, 
but with Orbán in its ranks the EPP candidate will have an extremely 
hard time winning the support of the other mainstream parties to 
lead the European Commission. Fidesz’s anti-democracy course will 
thus likely emerge as a serious impediment in the way of Manfred 
Weber’s, and hence the EPP’s ambitions. 
At the same time, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that 
these are tactical manoeuvres in a game where the strategic long-
term positions have been clearly staked out already. Orbán seems 
to have subordinated Hungary’s foreign policy interests to Russia’s 
foreign policy objectives, and whatever specific role Fidesz plays 
in the European Parliament and the EPP is far less consequential 
than this decision. That the Russian president prefers a weak and 
divided Europe is fairly obvious at this point, but what specific moves 
this long-term preference takes in any given situation, and how 
this interacts with Orbán’s own needs and preferences, is just too 
complex to anticipate at this point. 
With the US’s strategic attention shifting decisively towards China – 
a shift that began already under Obama but has become especially 
pronounced under Donald Trump – the Russian government’s efforts 
at reasserting its traditional influence over the central European 
region seem to run into American forbearance for now. The more 
important question for Hungary than the EP issue is how Orbán plans 
to position Hungary vis-à-vis the European project in general, and 
whether he is in fact trying to gradually open the door to leave the EU 
in the event that the outside pressure on his illiberal regime becomes 
too much to bear. Thus, to understand the foreign policy milestone 
ahead, what we need to track continuously in addition to Orbán’s 
tactical games among European political groups are his domestic 
moves, the way the propaganda is used to win the hearts and minds 
of Hungarians for and against foreign partners and allies. 
3.3 Outlook on Hungary’s place in the world 
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4.1  General overview 
of the Hungarian 
economy 
The uptick in economic activity which had started in the previous year 
continued in 2018. While the driving force behind earlier expansions 
was the influx of EU development funds, this was now partly replaced 
by construction, commerce and tourism. The adjustment in growth 
structure was also coupled with a departure from earlier predictions 
for the macroeconomic trajectory of the country. Hungary began 
to show the signs of an overheating economy with historically low 
unemployment, a steadily growing inflation rate and a U-turn in the 
external balance. At the same time, the fully-fledged economic regime 
of Viktor Orbán has also started to show some signs of vulnerability: 
labour shortages, the unequal distribution of the benefits of growth 
and new policy proposals aimed at curbing workers’ rights raised 
social tensions.
 
Peaking growth on soaring investment and 
real wage expansion
In 2018, real GDP growth reached a year-on-year level of 4.3% 
according to estimates by the European Commission (see Table 2). 
This rate of economic expansion was the best performance of the 
preceding 13 years and was most probably the peak of an upward 
cycle of three years. Growth data also surpassed past estimations 
and put Hungary in the top five of EU-28 growth, albeit still behind 
Poland and Latvia in the CEE region. 
Expansion was spurred on by services, as well as commerce, catering 
and tourism (which grew by a combined 6.9% over the previous year). 
49
50 The Hungarian economy in 2018
The level of investment and construction activity also sped up in 
this period. All this constituted a re-alignment in terms of growth 
structure vis-á-vis previous years. Incoming EU funds – or, in most 
cases, their advances financed by the state budget – were still major 
growth factors, especially when it comes to construction. In fact, the 
government was on track to spend its entire EU allowance for the 
2014-2020 fiscal cycle by the spring of 2019.
However, as a new development, household consumption also 
stepped up in 2018 and became another major driver for growth. The 
surge in household demand (4.7% increase over the previous year) 
was both funded by increasing real income, close to an annualized 
12% between January and September in 2018, and more appetite for 
loans. Rising wages were closely intertwined with historically low 
unemployment rates and the development of labour shortages in 
many sectors (see below). 
Consumer prices were also affected by the surge in salaries primarily 
due to gradual increases in the minimum wage (and its wider 
economic effects) as well as labour shortages. The inflation rate 
reached 3% by the end of 2018, up from 2.4% the year before. The 
year-on-year figure in October 2018 reached 3.8% and was one of 
the highest in the EU-28. Price increases were expected to continue 
with multiple factors contributing to the trend. Hungarians forked 
out one of the most in the EU for gasoline as a ratio of average 
income. Food, alcohol and tobacco also drove up the price level (with 
the help of record levels of VAT and excise duties). But core inflation 
also followed suit, and passed 2.0% for the first time in years. 
Besides inflation, the external balance also showed signs of a 
reversal of long-standing macroeconomic trends. While a healthier 
global economy pulled up export figures in most bilateral relations, 
the slowing of the German economy limited growth potential in 
this respect. At the same time, the increase in domestic purchasing 
power strengthened imports with a growth in volume twice the size 
of that of exports. These combined trends led to a significant drop 
in the surplus of trade balance and dragged down GDP growth by 
1.7% on a yearly basis (GDP is the sum of consumption, investment, 
government spending and net export – the first three components 
expanded on a yearly basis). This reversal of fortunes in external 
economic ties is highlighted by the fact that in late 2017 the EU 
Commission had expected a current account balance of 3.3 for 2018 
as a percentage of GDP, whereas the actual figure turned out to be 
closer to 1.2 with a negative outlook. 
Indicators 2017 2018 2019 2020
GDP growth (%, yoy) 4,1 4,3 3,4 2,6
Inflation (%, yoy) 2,4 3,0 3,3 3,0
Unemployment (%) 4,2 3,6 3,3 3,2
Public budget balance (% of GDP) -2,2 -2,4 -1,9 -1,8
Gross public debt (% of GDP) 73,3 72,9 70,3 68,6
Current account balance (% of GDP) 3,0 1,2 -0,0 0,3
Table 2. Key indicators of the Hungarian economy (2017-2020)
Source: European Commission
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Despite its macroeconomic repositioning, Hungary largely held on to 
its position on various competitiveness rankings. The business climate 
generally friendly to FDI led Hungary to regain its previous places on 
at least some rankings after sliding back in 2017. On the annual list of 
the Institute for Management Development (IMD), Hungary gained 5 
places and was placed 47th out of 63 countries (in 2016 it had held 
the position of 46). It was still considerably behind the Czech Republic 
(29th), Poland (34th) and even trailed Russia (45th). On the refigured 
World Economic Forum list Hungary retained its 48th place out of 
140 countries. Although its score slightly improved (to reach 64.3) it 
lagged all other Visegrad 4 countries all the same. In sum, Hungary 
may have reached the zenith of the business cycle in 2018 and trends 
are expected to deteriorate in terms of growth, inflation and external 
balance (see more on this in the Outlook section).
 
A fiscal policy subjugated to the 
development model
The general government deficit remained tightly under control in 
2018 despite multiple expansionary elements in the budget. During 
the year the government ran a cash-flow deficit exceeding the 
original estimates which was mainly due to advance payments for EU 
structural funds. The public budget balance ended up around 2.3-2.4% 
of GDP, still below the EU-mandated limit of 3% and with an outlook 
for more deficit reduction in 2019. This type of fiscal restraint has 
become a hallmark of the Orbán government’s ruling since 2010 and 
is in line with the general characteristics of Orbán’s economic regime. 
The primary audience for the government’s macroeconomic policy is 
not ’Brussels’ or the IMF, but international investors and multinational 
corporations. It is with their interest in mind that policy is set in return 
for implicit support and – more often, than not: heavily subsidized 
– job creation. And it is with their interest in mind that Hungary has 
been moving steadily towards a lower taxation and lower spending on 
social integration and further away from the social democratic ideal 
of high human capital investments. The high level of infrastructure 
spending is also in line with this strategy of economic development 
(besides obvious reasons related to the financing of a Fidesz-aligned 
domestic oligarchy). 
Government communication boasted of the fact that the 
centralization rate dropped to 38.4% of GDP with the overall biggest 
tax cut in the EU. Nevertheless, Eurostat data shows that this 
rate is still comfortably above the 40% threshold and the country 
is positioned in the top third of EU countries in terms of both 
government expenditure and revenues. But one does not have to 
read between the lines to see that the ambition is for the adoption of 
the economic model of Ireland: a low tax, low welfare set-up tooled 
towards manufacturing and the export of manufactured goods. And 
this goal was served by a range of concrete policy decisions from a 
record low corporate tax rate to repressive labour regulations (see 
below). At the same time, despite government rhetoric claiming 
otherwise, Hungarian small and middle sized companies remained 
in a state of low growth, productivity and propensity to innovate 
according to the OECD. 
Tax policy is a key instrument in the policy mix of Fidesz. The 
social contributions for employers were further decreased by 2.5 
percentage point, with an almost similar cut envisaged for 2019. 
While this was beneficial from the point of view of the tax wedge (the 
overall tax level of employment), it was also a step towards defunding 
future pensions and one which sanctioned the elimination of 
mandatory employer contributions toward health care. A surcharge 
tax on personal incomes, a tax on financial sector companies and 
most fringe benefits were eliminated, while tax breaks for new 
investments were extended. Besides a VAT cut for milk, these 
initiatives mostly benefitted employers. Meanwhile, spending cuts 
and/or underinvestment in most social services from pensions to 
health care, education and social policy cemented a chronic crisis and, 
in some cases, led to outright emergencies (see below).
Tax cuts and the active support of multinational corporations 
resulted in no substantial reduction in the general government 
52 The Hungarian economy in 2018
deficit in an economy which most probably reached the high point of 
its growth. This short-sighted, pro-cyclical policy stance provoked 
disapproval by the European Commission. Experts in Brussels 
criticised the government for missing the opportunity in a period 
of above-trend growth to address longer term policy challenges, 
such as the aging of the population, the unsustainability of the 
pension system and anomalies in health care. As a result of pro-
cyclical policies the structural budget balance, which also takes 
into account the effects of the business cycle, was estimated to 
deteriorate further and closing in on 4% of GDP. This figure prompted 
the Commission to recommend a fiscal adjustment of at least 1% of 
GDP. 
In the final analysis, expansionary fiscal policy and the pre-
financing of EU transfers only allowed for a modest reduction in 
the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2018, from 73.3% to 72.9%. Having said 
that, given a taming of stimulus, the persistence of high nominal 
growth and the stabilisation of the exchange rate, the debt ratio is 
projected to decline at a more accelerated speed. One of the other 
outstanding risks to Hungarian sovereign debt was also partly 
neutralized in 2018. A Russian-backed extension of the Soviet-era 
Paks power station had been financed by an EUR 12.5 billion loan 
provided by Moscow. While the project experienced major setbacks 
and the deadline for completion was pushed back multiple times, 
a part sum amounting to EUR 78.2 million of the potentially toxic 
loan was swapped for other, cheaper sources of international 
financing, according to government sources. This may be followed 
by further similar manoueuvers. Moreover, it is still unclear, why the 
government had agreed to above-market rate interest and fees for 
the project with its Russian partners.
Because of the aforementioned questions surrounding a genuinely 
robust economic growth, such as its sustainability and multiple 
risk factors, international credit rating agencies were mainly left 
unimpressed with the government’s performance. Moody’s, one of 
the big three, retained its “Baa3” level categorization for Hungarian 
sovereign debt and, defying expectations, it also did not change its 
“stable” outlook. The other two major agencies (Fitch, Standard & 
Poor’s) also kept Hungarian state debt just above junk evaluation, 
with BBB- in both cases (i.e. on the lowest level of investment 
grade). The only difference is that they assigned a „positive” 
outlook to their analysis, anticipating a potential upgrade in 2019. 
Furthermore, just as in 2017, Hungary still lagged behind almost 
all other Central Eastern European countries (with the exception of 
Romania and Croatia), and was in class within itself in the Visegrad 
countries with its non-medium level investment grade.    
 
Free money and the re-emergence of 
financial imbalances
The year 2018 is best understood as a bonus year for the monetary 
policy	strategy	of	György	Matolcsy,	the	governor	of	the	central	bank	
since 2013. Over the year macroeconomic reality changed markedly 
(think inflation and the current account) yet the overall policy stance 
remained the same. Inflation, now temporarily surpassing the target 
rate of 3%, became a more acute challenge than deflation. The forint 
continued to lose value vis-á-vis the euro. And Brexit was just one 
of a slew of factors having an adverse influence on the current 
account. Yet the headline policy rate closed the year just under 1% – a 
historically low level it had been held at since May 2016. 
Nevertheless, multiple signs pointed toward, in MNB parlance, a 
“normalisation” of monetary policy in the making. While keeping the 
main policy rate low remained a sacrosanct tenet of Matolcsynomics, 
level-headed analysts expected a rate hike cycle to begin in 2019 at 
the latest. At the same time, many other expansionary features of 
the monetary policy mix were cut back (including a heavily subsidized 
lending programme called Funding for Growth Scheme which was 
supplanted by a more timid Market-Based Lending Scheme). These 
signalled that the era of (almost) free money may be over. 
The protracted honeymoon period of dovish monetary policy was 
enabled by the both systematic and lucky elimination of external 
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risk factors. Government debt was purposefully restructured in 
a way that allowed for domestic savings and forint-denominated 
bonds to finance the deficit. In this, the weight of foreign exchange-
based bonds in state debt-management was reduced from almost 
50% to around 20%. At the same time, a low international interest-
rate environment and less mark-up on Hungarian debt over 
German debt allowed for reduced interest rate payments to bond 
holders. 
The element of luck also played a facilitating role in maintaining the 
expansionary policy stance. International investors mostly ignored 
dubious loans related to a proposed Belgrade-Budapest railway, the 
extension of the Paks nuclear plant, and the large-scale manipulation 
of debt statistics via the quasi-governmental EXIMBANK in their 
country risk assessments (this latter had been unveiled by the 
Eurostat and the figures were duly corrected). Neither made, despite 
a brief scare in July, the historically low EUR-HUF exchange rate 
financial markets rethink their valuation of Hungarian interest rate 
policy. 
More importantly, the developments of new financial imbalances 
were not spotted on the radar by most onlookers. A particular 
concern was the housing market. The phenomenon, which in some 
newspaper report was called “loan mania”, was spurred on by 
multiple factors. Real wage growth, new subsidies for families with 
children, the introduction of “consumer-friendly” home loan products 
and a low stock of new real estate on the market all contributed. In 
2017, Budapest was fifth on a global list of housing price increases, 
and in 2018 new sales in the inner city of the capital broke a record. 
While the development of a full-blown asset bubble was still not an 
immediate threat, it became clear that a new cycle had started in 
household indebtedness.
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4.2  Social reality
The social reality of 2018 in Hungary was characterised by 
historically low unemployment, yet at the same time a near-crisis 
situation developed in key sectors such as health care and education 
due to mismanagement, under-investment and chronic labour 
shortages. Dismal demographic trends, resulting from ageing, mass 
emigration, anti-migrant propaganda and a low birth-rate also risked 
undermining the labour market over the mid-term which, therefore, 
served as a major threat to sustainable growth.
 
A tight but repressed labour market 
Employment in Hungary reached historic levels in 2018: it first crossed 
4.5 million in a country of 9.8 million citizens. With 57.000 new jobs 
added in the age category of 15-64 the employment rate rose by 1.1 
per cent to 69.8%. Inactives in this bracket counted 1.75 million – this 
was the labour reserve of the Hungarian economy, including parents 
with small children and students in higher education. Part-time work, 
a time-tested solution for workers with such special status, was 
virtually non-existent: only 178.000 employees worked less than 
36 hours a week, the second worst ratio in the EU after Bulgaria. 
The gender gap was also considerable with a 77% employment rate 
among working age men but only 62.7% for women. Finally, the 
exodus of young Hungarians to Western Europe was uninterrupted 
and the permanent loss of multiple hundred thousand workers in 
their prime was a real threat. 
It is in this context that unemployment figures are best understood. 
For those active on the labour market the unemployment rate fell to 
3.6%, the lowest on record. This figure was also 0.4% lower than what 
had been expected at the end of 2017 and put Hungary in the top four 
in terms of unemployment in the EU (with fellow Visegrad countries 
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Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as Germany). Nevertheless, 
by including participants in the public works programme, which was 
– for all intents and purposes – a substitution for the job-seeking 
benefits of old age, the head count of unemployed jumps to slightly 
below the EU average. Therefore, the relevance of public works for 
the facelift of official figures cannot be neglected even as the number 
of public works employees dropped from 187.000 to 133.000. 
The aforementioned statistics are indicative of a labour market close 
to its full capacity, given the circumstances. The active working age 
population profited from this state of affairs with an average of 12% 
real wage growth with further possible increases in the years to come. 
An elevated minimum wage, a product of a six-year wage agreement 
that had been concluded in 2016, also contributed to salaries, as did 
chronic labour shortages. Official statistics recorded around 88.000 
unfilled jobs, up 20% over the previous year. Furthermore, this data, 
a historic record on its own right, most probably underestimated 
the magnitude of the problem. The Ministry of Finance estimated 
an actual shortage twice the size of statistical figures; independent 
assessments put it closer to 200-300 thousand. This includes major 
sub-systems in the government sector including 4400 in education 
and 9000 in health care. 
The Fidesz-led government used this opportunity to streamline 
the central bureaucracy (although not the record number of state 
secretaries and under-secretaries). In what counts as a major lay-off, 
around 7000-9000 administrative services workers were let go – 
over 2000 from the ministry responsible for „human resources” (the 
portfolio of which covers almost all of social policy). A leaked proposal 
envisaged helping those deemed to be in surplus with setting up their 
own companies or with re-training for private sector jobs. 
Yet the prospect, idealised by the Orbán government, of private 
sector employment with one of the multinational investors in 
Hungary also began to show its uglier face both on the level of policy-
making and the factory floor. Global corporations, especially those 
active in the automobile industry, were wooed to Hungary with 
major cash handouts and a repressive labour code. In fact, the most 
important public upheaval, trade union backlash and – a rare, unified 
– offensive by opposition parties on Orbán’s new political-economic 
regime was related to working conditions.
 
In focus: The case of the “slave law” with 
international investors
One of the major issues of 2018 concerning economic and social policy 
was a controversial legislative proposal regarding overtime pay and 
regulations. The bill was dubbed the “slave law” by opposition parties 
due to its stipulations that favoured employers’ interests vis-á-vis 
those of the employees. Beyond its obvious implications related to 
labour policy, the issue also highlighted the complex political economy 
of Orbán-era Hungarian capitalism. 
The legislation proposed the modification of the Labour Code in terms 
of overtime pay and regulations. The time frame for which average 
overtime is calculated is due to be extended from the current one year 
limit to three years (it had been 2 months for years before that). The 
limit for extraordinary overtime – which is decided by the employer 
at will – was also increased to 400 hours on a yearly basis, regardless 
of the existence of a collective agreement. (Previously it had been set 
at 300 hours for sectors with a collective agreement, and for 250 
for those without.) It is notable that Hungarian employees already 
worked 2.7 hours more a week than the average EU worker. 
The proposal earned the “slave” label due to the fact that these 
modifications would have allowed employers, both domestic and 
international investors, to force their workforce to overtime work 
without any compensation for two and a half years. The idea for 
opening up the possibility for such “flexible arrangements” between 
social partners was first floated in Parliament in 2017. At that time, 
the proposal was withdrawn among widespread criticism. Yet labour 
shortages and the government’s willingness to cater to foreign 
investors led to a revival of the initiative in 2018. The ruling Fidesz 
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party framed the draft law as one creating opportunities for workers 
who want to work more. Nevertheless, the rules have created a back 
door for allowing a weekly working time exceeding the legal limit of 
48 hours.
Trade unions and opposition parties forcefully disagreed, as did 83% 
of the public according to one representative survey. Even otherwise 
relatively well-paid, non-belligerent workers such as those at a major 
Audi	plant	in	the	city	of	Győr	voiced	their	concerns	–	in	this	case	with	
an open letter written in German. Opposition parties highlighted 
the role of multinational corporations which worked closely with 
the government in ushering in the new regulations. According to 
Péter Szijjártó, minister for foreign affairs and trade, the revision of 
overtime rules was a longstanding request of German investors who 
faced a labour shortage. The new proposals would have augmented 
the competitiveness of the Hungarian labour market – the minister 
claimed. On 12 December 2018 the bill was passed in a scandalous 
session of parliament, followed by mass protests. 
The issue serves as instructive tale of how economics and political 
interests are intertwined in a manner that makes the introduction 
of major economic sanctions against countries with backsliding 
democracies almost impossible. The Hungarian government made 
a concerted effort to establish “strategic partnership” agreements 
with many multinationals with investments in the country. These 
provided, inter alia, generous tax exemptions, land rights, transport 
terminals and favourable social policies in exchange for foreign direct 
investment and loyalty for the government. The newly established 
Ministry for Innovation and Technology spearheaded this effort by, 
for instance, creating a test track for self-driving cars in Zalaegerszeg. 
In particular, the nexus between the Hungarian government and 
major players of the German automotive industry have become 
especially	 strong.	 Following	Opel	 (in	 Szentgotthárd),	 Audi	 (in	 Győr)	
and Mercedes (in Kecskemét), BMW also decided to establish a large 
plant in Hungary in 2018 (the concern chose Debrecen over Miskolc 
for its site). The direct cost for Hungarian taxpayers for creating 
around 1000 new jobs was HUF 12.3 billion (EUR 38 million). Reports 
put the average handout per job for similar agreements to HUF 10 
million –this equals multiple years of minimum wage salary. There 
were also ongoing processes with new negotiations with Volkswagen 
and Jaguar, among others. 
The story is also indicative of the authoritarian nature of Hungarian 
capitalism. During the parliamentary debate of the overtime 
proposals – pushed to a late-night session – the acting chairman 
of the sessions, a Fidesz appointee, expelled opposition MPs one 
by one citing procedural violations until no one was left to continue 
the debate. The final vote of the proposal was obstructed by the 
parliamentary opposition from both left and right. Fidesz-controlled 
House leadership broke this down with blatant procedural errors 
and clear infringements on the rights of opposition MPs. They also 
threatened with ‘painful’ consequences for what they regarded to 
be a ‘parliamentary coup’. The vote itself was carried out under non-
conventional circumstances (e.g. without using punch cards and with 
no opposition parliamentary notaries at hand) which may open up it 
to legal challenges. Yet the message was clear: in the capitalism built 
by Mr Orbán only the voice of multinational firms mattered. 
 
Health care in turmoil
In 2018, health care continued to be one of the few policy areas 
where the government remained on the defensive. Incessant media 
coverage of the demise of health services was a staple of daily life, 
including stories on the closing of the pre-birth section of major 
hospital in Budapest, on waiting times of up to 6 years for ankle 
operations and even on the lack of toilet paper in hospital lavatories. 
These news were also in stark contrast with the VIP treatment of 
state officials at some facilities. 
The declining trends in state-run health care were exacerbated by 
the ad hoc decisions of Miklós Kásler, the newly appointed minister 
for human resources, himself a medical doctor. He approved the 
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dismissal of a renowned cardiac surgeon, László Székely, referring 
to administrative misconduct. As a consequence, a number of 
operations had been postponed, which in one case may have proved 
to be fatal. Similar personnel changes at the drug administration, the 
surgeon general’s office and the ministry itself led to the outflow 
of professionals who had weathered previous purges in the Orbán-
period following the 2010 elections. 
The fear that the health care system could have come to a halt any 
day was substantiated by a series of resignations further away from 
the policy-making centre. Reports noted that complete departments 
tendered their notices to quit in Ajka, Pécs and at Honvéd hospital 
in Budapest, a key medical institution. Urgent care was featured 
pre-eminently in these accounts as reports noted waiting times of 
20-24 hours at vital care units in the capital and the countryside 
alike. Emergency rooms were often staffed with personnel with no 
adequate qualifications or experience and patients lingered there 
due to a lack of capacity to treat incoming cases by other divisions 
of hospitals.
Due to these circumstances extraordinary measures were required 
just to keep urgent care centres open. Wages soared for employees 
at at least some institutions, with nurses taking on double shifts 
beyond their usual overtime and half-legal secondary jobs at other 
hospitals. Labour shortages were also pervasive throughout the 
health care system to the point that staffing agencies were enlisted 
at many state institutions. Due to the emigration of medical doctors 
and nurses in search of jobs that pay multiples of their domestic 
salary many areas and specializations were left completely unserved. 
At least 332 general practitioners were missing from a system that 
counted 4755 among its members in 2016. The government made 
promises for a 70% wage hike to nurses again but their credibility was 
questionable in light of past “increases” which, in fact, made at least 
some medical personnel worse off.
At the same time, private health care has become a fast growing 
segment of the economy. According to research by consultancies, 
in just one year spending in private insurance increased by 40%. 
Recruitment to private providers was also in full swing; by 2018 
more than 45 thousand employees worked in the for-profit 
segment of health care out of a total of around 120 thousand. These 
developments are best understood in the context of a proposed ban 
on extra services in state hospitals – the Fidesz-aligned oligarchy 
made timely investments in private health care provision and was 
ready to step in to cater to the upper-middle class. 
The ground for the evolution of a two-tiered health care, one for 
the haves and one for the have nots, was also set by the systematic 
defunding of public provision. One country of reference, the Czech 
Republic was placed 9 places above Hungary on an EU list of 
government health care spending as a ration of GDP. Private citizens 
covered 29% of their health-related spending out of their own 
pocket – experts of the World Health Organizations recommended 
a maximum level of 15% as higher values would certainly result in 
inadequate provisions for those less well-off. 
 
Chronic underinvestment in education and 
social services
Chronic underinvestment was also evident in many other areas of 
pivotal social services, including primary and secondary education 
and the alleviation of poverty. As for higher education and science, 
the government and its allies in the media waged a bona fide war 
on what they considered to be dissenting institutions and individuals. 
Yet education and an increased life expectancy is the only way out for 
sustained growth in an economy close to its full potential and where 
xenophobic media slurs on guest workers remain common.
It is in this context that the key education policy decision of post-2010 
Orbán cabinets revealed itself the policy failure it had always been 
destined to be. In 2011, upon heavy lobbying by the Fidesz-aligned 
Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the compulsory 
age of school attendance had been decreased from 18 to 16. Taking 
59
into account the fact that Hungary had one of the lowest rates of 
education spending in OECD countries at the time, it should not 
have come as a surprise that the already unsatisfactory levels of 
reading comprehension and math skills (as measured by the PISA 
test) dropped to dismal levels. The ratio of students failing the tests 
for reading and for natural science jumped by around 8 percentage 
points. 
By 2018 the exact same employer pressure groups which had 
lobbied for more low-skilled labour, i.e. students straight out of 
vocational school, lamented the fact that a quarter of the student 
population leaves school as a functional illiterate. Although education 
spending was eventually lifted to slightly exceed the EU average, 
chronic mismanagement and mistaken policy priorities (such as the 
centralisation of school administration and even those of textbooks) 
left a lasting mark on the sector. 
Moreover, things turned from bad to worse on the higher education 
market. What had been unthinkable for most observers as late as 
2017 became reality in 2018. The Central European University, a 
higher education institution which was the most integrated into the 
international science ecosystem in Hungary, was forced out of the 
country for political reasons (see chapter 5.3). Elsewhere, Corvinus 
University, one of the most popular targets for top-of-their-class high 
school students, was being privatized with unclear consequences for 
future tuition and enrolment possibilities for students with modest 
backgrounds. At ELTE, the biggest higher education institution in the 
land, biology professors went on strike as they had to fund supplies 
for experiments out of their own pockets. As a result of stealth 
privatization, underfinancing and the overall uncertainty surrounding 
the sector, many of the brightest students went to study abroad, 
an emerging and alarming trend which compounded the brain drain 
already in place in research and development. 
If education was a non-priority sector for the right-wing 
government then social policy was a true black sheep of the family. 
The demographic crisis continued with a shrinking birth rate, high 
mortality rate and a virtual ban on guest workers (it was virtual 
because for many companies based in Eastern Hungary Ukrainian 
guest workers were very much welcome). Over the course of the 
quarter century since regime change, 300.000 students went 
„missing” from primary and secondary education. The Fidesz party 
once again looked for solutions which were only beneficiary for 
those with considerable savings and with a lofty taxable income. At 
the same time the real value of the universal child care allowance 
continued to wane. 
Child poverty was rampant with one in three children missing out 
on basic services and healthy food. This put Hungary in the hardly 
glorious group of countries in the EU allowing such inhumane 
conditions along with Romania, Bulgaria and Greece. In 2018, it took 
seven generations to break out of poverty which was only good for 
the position of dead last in EU rankings. With continued repression 
against a growing population of homeless it became clear that if 
trickle-down effects from massive economic growth exist, they 
certainly did not present themselves in Hungary.
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4.3 Economic outlook 
for 2019
Forecasts for the Hungarian economy broadly agree that by 2018 
the business cycle had matured and 2019 will be characterised 
by a cool off. According to our survey of reports by international 
organizations, including the European Commission, the OECD 
and the IMF, real GDP is expected to grow by 3.3-3.9%, a near 
percentage point drop from the previous year. While pro-cyclical 
fiscal and monetary policy, including the influx of EU transfers, is 
set to be continued, the potential slowing of the world economy 
and key export markets will be a risk factor. Having said that, with 
numerous major construction projects under way and other, e.g. 
FDI investments in full swing the downturn may only start in 2020 
when the developing construction capacity bottleneck will exert 
itself. 
The labour market will also come close to what economists call full 
employment: the lowest possible rate which still does not cause 
inflation. The European Commission forecasts a drop from 3.6 to 
3.3 per cent, while the IMF estimates a similar drop to 3.5%. These 
constitute historically low levels of unemployment and, given the 
fact that several hundred thousands of working age Hungarians 
emigrated and the ongoing government propaganda against – 
at least some types of – migrant workers, reserves for further 
employment are limited. The effects of public sector layoffs and 
retraining initiatives for participants in the public works programme 
on private sector employment are also far from a foregone conclusion. 
What is more certain is that real wage growth will continue given a 
net increase in corporate investments in labour intensive sectors, 
such as construction. 
Trends on the labour market will also play a key role in shaping the 
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consumer price index. Inflation may reach 3.3%, or even 4%, according 
to the OECD, which is the upper limit of the tolerance band of the 
central bank and the highest level in six years. Fuel and food prices 
will continue to push the headline rate up but the core inflation figure 
is also expected to rise, way above 3%. As the Hungarian forint lost 
almost 8% of its value vis-á-vis the euro since early 2015, inflation 
has also been imported – a trend which is expected to continue 
due to, inter alia, a higher price for essential energy imports. These 
tendencies will be buttressed by the aforementioned wage growth 
which will prompt excess import demand. 
In 2019, fiscal policy will retain its pro-cyclical characteristics without 
jeopardizing its medium-term stability. Expansionary steps include 
tax reductions for home buying for families with children, a multi-
step programme of scaling down social security contributions and 
a VAT exemption for small businesses. Despite warnings by the 
European Commission regarding the structural balance, meeting the 
Maastricht criterion of 3% budget deficit as a ratio of the GDP will not 
prove to be a serious challenge. The public budget balance is forecast 
to be around 1.9-2.0% of GDP buoyed by tax revenues from larger 
than expected growth. Estimates suggest that strong economic 
activity will also contribute to a further drop in gross public debt, 
to slightly above 70% of GDP, although not as much as what was 
expected at the end of 2017. 
The pro-cyclical nature of monetary policy is even more glaring. 
Despite	accelerating	inflation	György	Matolcsy	and	the	Central	Bank	
has not abandoned their policy of low interest rates. This decision 
was enabled by the European Central Bank which, in contrast to the 
approach of the FED which had started to raise the headline rate, 
opted for the postponement of rate hikes amid an environment of 
low inflation and low growth in the Eurozone. The base rate set by the 
Central Bank of Hungary was held at 0.9% in September 2018 with a 
stable outlook, although at least some non-conventional tools, such 
as the purchase of mortgage securities, were discontinued resulting 
in a slightly tighter monetary policy. 
Beyond its obvious incompatibility with domestic trends of the 
consumer price index, two factors may nudge the central bank 
towards reconsidering its policy stance in 2019. First, the depreciation 
of the forint will push up prices in an economy functioning at its 
full potential and ever more reliant on import goods. On a related 
note, the balance of the current account is expected to deteriorate 
further: the IMF projects a drop to 2.1% of GDP while the Commission 
is more pessimistic: it forecasts a decrease from 1.2 per cent to an 
even balance partly due to price increases in imported energy. This 
estimation is in stark contrast with projections at the end of 2017 
when the Hungarian economy was still on track for a 3.2 surplus for 
2019. 
The mid-term outlook for the fully-fledged economic regime of 
Viktor Orbán is also dependent on a major political factor. As we 
indicated above, EU structural funds allocated to the country for 
the 2014-2020 period will be all but used up by the time of spring 
2019. With the slowing of key export markets, such as Germany, 
and the gradual loss of wage competitiveness, EU transfers will 
remain pivotal in maintaining excess growth over the rate of the 
Eurozone. Unfortunately, the international reputation of Hungary 
under Prime Minister Orbán is far from ideal entering this key 
period of negotiations related to the budget period 2021-2027. 
Furthermore, a potential loss of EU transfers is not counterpoised 
by investments in human capital: poverty remains rampant and 
the education sector continues to lose both qualified teachers 
and incoming students. Therefore, it is unclear whether the three-
pillared, neoliberal (see tax cuts and labour policy), export-oriented 
and EU-funded model of growth is feasible over the mid-term and 
the country can make the transition from a developmental model 
based on low-skilled labour and a “flexible” labour market.
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5 The Hungarian society 
in 2018
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For Fidesz’s media movers and shakers, the past year was vital as 
the impact of years of painstaking work invested in rebuilding the 
Fidesz media empire – which had taken a significant hit in 2014-
2015 – contributed to deliver an overwhelming election victory 
to the governing party. This success was subsequently amplified 
by the dissolution of the largest opposition media portfolio, the 
Simicska media holding. Thanks to the successful crippling of Lajos 
Simicska’s media and the creation of a huge media conglomerate 
at the end of the year, Viktor Orbán now wields sole control of a 
vast media empire that is far bigger than what he had in 2014, when 
he took the daring step of upsetting the carefully crafted media 
system that had served him so well. Before reviewing in detail how 
2018 marked the culmination of these efforts, let’s take a brief look 
back at the events that triggered the developments that led up to 
this year. 
 
An oligarch challenges…and an oligarch 
challenged 
After his re-election victory in 2014, Viktor Orbán assessed that 
the time had come to reorganise the media empire that is widely 
considered one of the fundamental elements of Fidesz’s increasingly 
strong hold on public power in Hungary. Meddling with this 
structure was a risky undertaking. Thanks to friendly oligarchs, first 
and foremost Orbán’s longtime friend Lajos Simicska, Hungary’s 
leading rightwing party had invested heavily in building the Fidesz-
aligned media empire during lean opposition years, between 
2002 and 2010. These media played a vital role in maintaining 
the party’s public profile in opposition, and they were also vital in 
expanding its influence over public opinion after Fidesz’s election 
victory in 2010, boosted also by the growing financial pressure on 
independent and leftwing media. Fidesz also gained total control 
over the public media after 2010, and it practically became part of 
the media empire of the governing party. Yet by 2014 the alliance 
and friendship between Orbán and Simicska had become frayed, 
and after comfortably winning re-election, the prime minister set 
out to radically scale back Simicska’s power in all segments of his 
government, including Simicska’s de facto right to appoint several 
key economic policy officials in the Orbán cabinet. 
Since Simicska controlled several crown jewels in the pro-Fidesz 
media segment, entering into a conflict with him was always a 
gamble, though arguably the risks were not as serious as some 
critical media tried to make out. Simicska was the owner of the 
leading rightwing news channel Hír TV, the leading rightwing political 
daily Magyar Nemzet, the leading commercial radio Class FM and 
the talk show radio Lánchíd, as well as the free daily Metropol, a 
tabloid with a more subdued political tone but a huge circulation 
and wide reach. The fallout from Orbán’s pressure on Simicska 
was probably even worse than the prime minister anticipated, as 
Simicska publicly attacked Orbán, severed all ties with Fidesz and 
turned his previously devoutly pro-government media outlets into 
powerhouses of investigative journalism and staunch government 
criticism. Simicska made no secret of his intention to oust Orbán. 
Orbán, for his part, was less explicit, but an unceasing stream of 
punitive actions against all of Simicska’s business holdings spoke 
louder than words; he wanted to either annihilate Simicska and his 
media outlets or reintegrate them into the Fidesz fold, decoupled 
from their owner. 
5.1 2018: The year the second Fidesz media 
empire was completed 
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A swift end to the challenger’s fortune
Since it was reasonable to assume that sustaining these media 
outlets would quickly make a big dent in Simicska’s formidable 
financial reserves, there was no question that he would not be able 
to hold out another four years as the sole anti-Fidesz oligarch. The 
question was only how quickly he would pull the plug. Simicska did 
not leave the interested public guessing for long – a mere few days 
after the 2018 election the inevitable happened and the oligarch 
suspended the prestigious daily Magyar Nemzet and the Lánchíd 
Rádió, and put the rest of his media empire on notice, including the 
weekly Heti Válasz which survived only a little while longer (the 
tabloid Metropol and the radio Class FM, the two Simicska outlets 
with the biggest audience reach by far, had already been driven 
out of the market by custom-made regulatory changes). 
The only Simicska-held brand surviving is the news channel HírTV, 
which was returned to Fidesz neatly packaged by Simicska’s 
confidante and business partner Zsolt Nyerges, the only person 
who maintained close ties with both Simicska and the governing 
party. Nyerges was thus the ideal go-between in the liquidation 
of the Simicska empire. The newly installed leadership at HírTV 
immediately made clear that the channel would be returning to the 
pro-Fidesz editorial line that had characterised it before 2015, and 
quickly moved to fire everyone who was assumed to be committed 
to independent or critical journalism.
 
A large media conglomerate under 
Orbán’s control
With the taking back of HírTV and the destruction of the remaining 
parts of the Simicska empire, Fidesz’s consolidation of the media 
market has made enormous strides. In parallel, another process 
was ongoing, which was less visible but nevertheless turns out 
to be even more important. After years of building parallel media 
pillars, Orbán has once again moved towards concentrating his 
media holdings in one hand. The new boss of the Orbán media is an 
old loyalist, Gábor Liszkay. He essentially became a sort of editor-
in-chief of the entire pro-Fidesz media conglomerate. The single 
giant umbrella organisation, the Central European Press and Media 
Foundation, was established as a nonprofit organisation.
The significant part of the Hungarian media, 476 titles including most 
of the flagships of Fidesz’s media empire are now the property of the 
Central European Press and Media Foundation. The unification of 
the media portfolios of various oligarchs linked to Fidesz happened 
suddenly at the end of November, with a number of pro-government 
media owners voluntarily offering their shares to the foundation on 
the same day – for free.
For some observers this move was somewhat of a surprise 
because in 2014/2015, as the depth of the breach between Orbán 
and Simicska became apparent, it was rumoured that one of the 
lessons that Orbán had learned was not to leave too much power 
in one place, and the subsequent trajectory of the expansion of the 
Fidesz’s media empire largely bore this out. The expansion was 
built	 around	 3-4	 main	 actors	 (Lőrinc	 Mészáros,	 Andy	 Vajna	 and	
Árpád Habony clearly played major roles), with many minor players 
controlling smaller stakes in the market. However, it could be also 
argued that Orbán has learned the Simicska-lesson well, as the 
new foundation is controlled through a board. This structure makes 
it possible to control the effects of any potential future internal 
conflicts better, and no meddling with ownership structures would 
be necessary again.    
A few days after the announcement about the new media holding, 
Orbán signed a decree exempting the foundation from scrutiny 
by media or competition authorities. The decree simply lists the 
companies involved in the merger and qualifies the unprecedented 
acquisition as a “merger of strategic importance at a national 
level”, and cites “public interest” as the reason for this qualification, 
without further explanation. It is not an exaggeration to conclude 
that this decision just makes the state capture of Hungarian media 
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more visible and transparent, and also makes it obvious that the 
government media empire has been elevated above the rest of the 
media market.
 
A spectacular shift
Looking at the close to 500 media outlets controlled by Fidesz, three 
striking aspects stand out. First, the audience reach and size of 
this empire are far bigger than before it took its major hit in 2015. 
Moreover, there have never been as many voters for whom Fidesz 
media are the sole source of information – even though unlike the 
ideological diehards who voluntarily seal themselves in their filter 
bubbles, a large segment of these voters have not consciously made 
a decision to seclude themselves from independent information.
This is a logical consequence of the second striking feature of the 
Fidesz-dominated media landscape, namely that many of the 
media outlets in question have been taken over recently by Fidesz. 
Through its newly acquired media, the governing party’s propaganda 
machinery has gained access to a politically diverse and unaligned 
audience, most significantly (in terms of audience reach) thanks to 
TV2, Origo and Bors. It is not unreasonable to assume that these 
media have played a major role in consolidating Fidesz’s electoral 
support. Despite optimistic opposition expectations, the governing 
party ended up substantially outperforming its impressive 2014 tally, 
adding new blocks of voters even as it forfeited the support of some 
narrow segments of its former electorate, primarily among higher 
educated urban residents, few of whom are likely to follow TV2 or 
Bors (nor Origo, at this point). 
Finally, the expansion of the pro-Fidesz media empire has gone hand 
in hand with a spectacular decline in the number and audience reach 
of independent and opposition media outlets. In addition to turning 
some unaligned media into propaganda outlets, Fidesz has directly 
or indirectly shuttered Hungary’s two largest political broadsheets, 
the centre-left Népszabadság and the centre-right Magyar Nemzet, 
the two largest commercial radios, Class FM and Neo FM, along with 
a number of smaller outlets, such as Heti Válasz and Lánchíd Rádió. 
 
How much is enough?
The biggest question now is where Orbán will stop. Apart from a 
number of popular online outlets (hvg.hu, 24.hu, 444.hu), some print 
newspapers (Népszava, 168óra, Magyar Narancs) and small sites 
(atlatszo.hu, direkt36.hu) that have performed some amazing feats 
of investigative journalism in the past years, the current situation 
leaves two major independent players in the market: Hungary’s 
leading news portal, Index.hu, and leading commercial television 
channel, RTL Klub. RTL has been a long-time target of Orbán’s 
aspirations and ire, but it appears that for the time being that is one 
notch Orbán will not be able to put in his belt. 
With the fall of its owner Lajos Simicska, Index.hu, however has 
become extremely vulnerable. Index was previously omitted in the 
listing of major Simicska media holdings, and that was not an accident. 
In part to reassure the online newspaper’s readers regarding Index’s 
independence, for a while Simicska did not even out himself as the 
owner, and by the time the stunning information became public, it 
was aired in combination with the announcement that in practice 
the ownership rights would be exercised by a foundation chaired 
by the newspaper’s longtime attorney, László Bodolai, whom the 
newsroom trusts to preserve its independence. How robust this 
structure is remains in doubt, however, and concerns have multiplied 
since it emerged that Simicska has also divested itself of the media 
holding that comprises Index – selling it to two businesspeople, one 
of whom is a Fidesz-aligned municipal politician with a history of 
publicly maligning Index. While Index is technically independent, two 
problems remain. 
First, it is unclear how difficult it would be for new owners to 
take control of the foundation if they wish to do so. Second, even 
assuming that it would be a protracted process to take direct control 
68 The Hungarian society in 2018
of Index, the new owners already control its source of income, since 
the company with the exclusive right to sell Index’s advertising 
(CEMP) is part of their new holding and does not enjoy a protected 
legal status as the newsroom. Index has ample readership and 
advertising to support itself, but legally it cannot do so without 
the cooperation of its owners. That is why the newsroom, which 
also harbours doubt as to whether it can survive as an independent 
outlet under these conditions, has begun to solicit direct funding 
from its readers. 
Fidesz clearly intends to leave some opposition media in place, it does 
not want to be confronted with the charge that it has completely 
strangled all opposition outlets. At the same time, it wants to exert a 
high level of control over what type of information reaches audiences, 
and the current system is designed to broadly meet this requirement 
of controlled dissent. What level of dissent is tolerated or deemed 
too much depends on the eye of the beholder, but arguably Index 
is too much, especially if it keeps unearthing corruption scandals. If 
Index would not be allowed to survive another four-year term, for 
the battered Hungarian realm of public discourse, the blow would be 
tremendous.
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When it comes to finalise his vision for Hungary, it appears that 
the Hungarian prime minister still has a lot of details left to work 
on. Thus, Orbán announced during the summer that he wants to 
shift his attention to a hitherto neglected area, namely culture. 
In this realm Orbán perceives that the system he has built is still 
incomplete, he has yet to leave a decisive mark in culture. The 
announcement,	made	 at	 his	 annual	 speech	 in	 Tusnádfürdő	 at	 an	
event held for the ethnic Hungarian community in Romania, did not 
come as a surprise, nor did the aspiration Orbán expressed therein. 
As often, his statement was the temporary culmination of a long-
term campaign. 
Orbán said that the System of National Cooperation, dubbed NER 
in Hungarian, which he had promised to build in 2010 had been 
the subject of ridicule before. However, in reality he and Fidesz 
have achieved far more than what he retrospectively considers 
the relatively limited ambitions of the NER. The issue at hand, thus 
Orbán, is no longer that of building a new system but of shaping an 
entire epoch – in his image, presumably. To this end, major changes 
can be expected in culture, Orbán promised. 
It is readily apparent why cultural policy would be a vital aspect of 
this aspiration. In centuries hence – and that is clearly where Orbán’s 
thinking is shifting as he heaps electoral success upon success – 
politicians will not be remembered for fixing schools and hospitals 
(the state of Hungarian schools and hospitals is an excellent reflection 
of this insight), but among the things they might be remembered for 
is their ability to shape the cultural landscape. 
Still, even though it may seem to mostly concern symbolic issues, 
such as statues, monuments and commemorations, or funding or the 
denial thereof for certain artists, the issue does have actual critical 
impact, especially through education. 
 
Leaving a conservative mark in culture
For a fuller picture and what it tells us about the workings of 
Orbán’s system in 2018, it is also worth reviewing the chronology 
of the events that led up to Orbán’s declaration of the new culture 
war.	 In	 his	 remarks	 in	 Tusnádfürdő,	 Orbán	 expressly	 lauded	 the	
cultural policy debate that had been launched in the pages of the 
pro-Fidesz press in the weeks prior to his speech. That was very 
revealing, it explained the choreography behind that debate which 
previously had everyone guessing whether pro-Fidesz henchmen 
were running amok out of sheer fanaticism in the pages of the 
government’s	main	mouthpiece,	the	daily	Magyar	Idők,	or	whether	
they were setting the stage for a broader policy pronouncement. It 
was the latter. 
The debate centred around newspaper articles, in which ultra-
conservatives went after moderate pro-Fidesz intellectuals for 
using the taxpayer-funded cultural institutions they run to provide 
space for “liberal” views. Specifically, the director of the State Opera 
House, Szilveszter Ókovács, was attacked for allowing Billy Elliot, an 
opera that presumably promotes a pro-homosexuality agenda, to be 
presented at his institution. Ókovács misunderstood the signs of the 
time and mocked the author for her myopic outlook in response. A 
few days later he apologised in another article and cancelled a large 
portion of the scheduled Billy Elliot performances. And to make clear 
that the message had been received, he recently announced that the 
Opera’s next season would focus on Christianity. 
5.2  Fidesz sets its sights on culture and science 
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The	other	target	was	Gergely	Prőhle,	the	head	of	Hungary’s	leading	
literary	museum,	the	Petőfi	Museum.	Prőhle	also	defended	himself	
against the charges of using his office to support liberal authors 
and giving supposedly liberal events a platform. He seemed better 
insulated against criticisms because even though he is moderate 
by Fidesz standards, as a former government official and senior 
diplomat he has a rich history of staunchly defending Orbán against 
international criticisms. However, his past as a Fidesz loyalist did not 
save him, and he was not even given the chance to continue with a 
marked	conservative	shift:	Prőhle	was	sacked	in	November.	
The resistance within Fidesz to strong-arming the cultural and 
scientific sphere is more pronounced than usual, but it is still proffered 
by figures whose influence has been on the wane. The poet, Fidesz 
MP and former state secretary László L. Simon and his colleague 
Géza	Szőcs,	a	former	state	secretary	for	culture,	both	criticised	the	
perceived attempt to appropriate the cultural sphere for political 
purposes or to subject it to political control. L. Simon insisted that 
like all art, national-conservative art should distinguish itself through 
performance rather than governmental backing. 
The openness of these figures to speak out – which is also a reflection 
of the fact that they lost their positions and influence and are unlikely 
to regain them – shows what a sensitive area Fidesz is moving into, 
and how concerned people with intimate knowledge of Fidesz’s 
ability to tread carefully are about what can be expected when you let 
the bull loose in the china shop. At the same time, some conservative 
intellectuals have declared victory already and are fantasising about 
the mortal blow they wish to deal to the left-liberal dominance in the 
cultural realm.
 
Academic freedom also under attack
In fact, the war over cultural, educational and scientific hegemony 
was already raging, only its broader context is more explicit now. The 
open season on academia was announced earlier in the year when 
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the government sent the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA), the 
leading body for organising academic research in Hungary, a draft of 
a new proposal to strip it of the control of half of its research funds. 
This money will be disbursed by the government from now on to 
ensure that they no longer fund research that the government deems 
too theoretical or politically misguided. The MTA was given an hour 
to comment on the proposal it received by e-mail. The MTA story has 
not ended yet, the decisions about the restructuring of its research 
centres are expected to be made in the first half of 2019. 
Another leading moderate pro-Fidesz intellectual who got caught up 
in the crossfire of the propaganda war that Fidesz simultaneously 
launched against science was József Pálinkás, a renowned nuclear 
physicist who had previously held the position of Minister of Education 
in the first Orbán government (between 2001-2002), and has quietly 
served as the government-appointed head of the National Research, 
Development and Innovation Office since 2014. Even as he delivered 
the obligatory profession of loyalty to Orbán, Pálinkás – also subject 
to stinging personal attacks in pro-Fidesz media, with one outlet 
scurrilously describing the quiet scientist as the leader of anti-Orbán 
academics – criticised the government’s recent policies in the area of 
science. It was no surprise that he also had to go during the summer. 
It is hard to tell whether the motivation of the government’s decision 
to take direct control of science funding was motivated by a general 
desire for greater centralisation; the redistribution of the funds 
towards different goals; or the objective of further expanding its 
political control – vitally, also by defunding disliked scholars. It is 
probably a combination of all these factors, but there is reason to 
suspect that political control is the primary incentive here.
 
Gender studies banned
The major question for everyone is how far the government will go 
in its occupation of the cultural realm. The less hysterical responses 
suggest that governmental control over culture does not work, it 
is always superficial, haphazard, impermanent, etc. This does not 
consider the temporary toll that an intense government effort might 
take, nor even does it illuminate what temporary might mean in this 
context – a few years, a generation? 
Moreover, a narrow concentration on culture will fail to consider the 
huge impact that the government could exert on education, which 
appears is part of the plan (the debate about “instilling national pride” 
in students or the fact that private Christian schools receive more 
state funding per student than state schools indicate the direction). 
The sudden ban of gender studies programmes in Hungary, intended 
as a symbolic strike against a scientific field that is considered 
emblematic of the liberal influence on education, is a thus far 
limited illustration of the potentially massive risks of a government 
comprehensively subordinating the educational system to ideological 
goals. Increasingly muscular pronouncements by government 
officials suggest that there is a political will towards greater control, 
although the work to translate this into actual policies is sometimes 
very time-consuming and thus the timing of the actual changes is 
difficult to anticipate. 
One striking aspect of the current debate is that the prime minister’s 
proclamation of the government wanting to take control of cultural 
life to reshape it comprehensively does not even elicit a debate about 
“how can they?” Such an announcement is part of the new “normal” 
in Hungary – the only question that is actually subject to debate is 
how far the process will go.
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Fidesz made no secret of the fact that it planned to structure its 
entire 2018 election campaign around the Soros and migration 
issues, which the governing party suggests amount to the same 
thing anyway. The American-Hungarian billionaire is portrayed by 
the government as a villain who wants to destroy Europe through 
mass migration. In reality, the connection between Soros and 
migration is extremely thin, it is based on an op-ed (the claims in 
which Soros subsequently modified in light of the realities of the 
refugee crisis) and the fact that the philanthropist funds a variety 
of civil organisations in Hungary, some of which were also active 
in helping refugees – and many of which are critical of the Orbán 
government’s policies, particularly in the context of the specialised 
areas they work in. 
The tenuous connection between the philanthropist and the 
refugee crisis is not even remotely strong enough to justify the 
broader accusation, much less the tens of billions of forints in 
taxpayer money that Fidesz has funnelled to advertising agencies, 
PR companies and media owned by friends to smear Soros, 
refugees and NGOs. The cost of Fidesz’s obsession with Soros and 
refugees has reached proportions that are discernible at the GDP 
level, and even if a significant portion of the outlays merely serves 
as a corruption instrument and a way to fund pro-government 
media (the anti-Soros ads are a big chunk of the pro-Fidesz media’s 
advertising revenue), it is also something with real and actual 
impact on society. 
 
What’s it for?
Concerning Fidesz’s goals with the anti-Soros/anti-NGO/anti-
migration campaign, the year 2018 has proved that these are not 
just campaign gimmicks and Fidesz does not let these issues go 
after winning the elections. It is true that Fidesz uses these topics 
as its dominant campaign themes. Orbán has indeed used these 
issues to consolidate and energise a reliable Fidesz base of 2 million+ 
voters, but many observers now believe that the destruction of 
civil society in Hungary is the actual goal. Therefore, the migration 
issue and the surrounding campaigns are instruments in the long-
term consolidation of Fidesz’s power in a society in which dissent is 
barely if at all present.
The often successful attempts at silencing dissenting voices have 
merged into an obvious pattern that both Hungarian society and 
the country’s western partners ignore at their own peril. It was no 
surprise for anyone that the crackdown on NGOs and the Central 
European University continued after the election as well. 
 
Stop Soros
A few days after the re-election of the Fidesz government, pro-
government	weekly	Figyelő	published	a	list	of	over	200	names	that	
it claims are “mercenaries” paid by Soros to topple the government. 
Those on the list included members of rights organisations such as 
Amnesty International, anti-corruption watchdog Transparency 
International, refugee advocates, investigative journalists and 
faculty and officials from CEU, some of them deceased. Orbán has 
long accused NGOs funded by Soros of conspiring against the state 
and representing a threat to national security. Vowing to defend 
“Christian Europe”, he made the “Stop Soros” bill a flagship piece of 
legislation, and one of first to be passed by the new parliament (it 
was adopted in June). The parliament also approved a change to the 
Hungarian constitution that states that an “alien population” cannot 
be settled in Hungary.
 5.3 Stop Soros: the war on NGOs and CEU 
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Understandably, the atmosphere became unbearable for some 
key targets. Citing “an increasingly repressive political and legal 
environment”, George Soros’s Open Society Foundations announced 
in May to move their Budapest-based international operations and 
staff to Berlin. „The government of Hungary has denigrated and 
misrepresented our work and repressed civil society for the sake 
of political gain, using tactics unprecedented in the history of the 
European Union”, said Patrick Gaspard, president of the Open Society 
Foundations. „It has become impossible to protect the security of 
our operations and our staff in Hungary from arbitrary government 
interference”, he added.
Under the provisions of the new law, dubbed the “Stop Soros law”, 
it became a criminal offence to carry out “organisational activities” 
that assist immigrants not entitled to protection with asylum 
requests, and to help people “residing illegally in Hungary” to get 
a residence permit. The new law creates a new category of crime, 
called “promoting and supporting illegal migration” – essentially, 
banning individuals and organizations from providing any kind of 
assistance to undocumented immigrants. 
As expected, most of the organisations that Fidesz presumably 
targets have vehemently rejected the idea that they are engaged 
in any activity that qualifies as help for illegal migration, and it is 
unlikely that they will pay a tax any time in the future for an activity 
the admission of which would label them as criminal. “The primary 
aim of this legislation is to intimidate, by means of criminal law, 
those who fully legitimately assist asylum seekers or foreigners,” 
the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, a local human rights group, 
explained. “It threatens to jail those who support vulnerable people.”
 
Deliberately vague? 
Two leading European rights bodies, the Council of Europe and the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have 
criticised the new law as arbitrary and vague and said it contravenes 
European law. Other critics have also argued that it represents a 
further attempt by the government to silence or eradicate NGOs 
that fail to conform to its nationalist policies and agenda.
The text of the law lacks clarity, which suggests that the government 
pursues political objectives with the law rather than legal ones. It 
bears pointing out: the vagueness of the law does not necessarily 
imply that the government does not really intend to apply it. An 
alternative interpretation is that it does not want to be bound by the 
limitations in the applicability of the law that a clear definition would 
result in. It will be up to the Constitutional Court to decide whether 
to render the law void for vagueness, and the Court tends to rule in 
Fidesz’s favour, though there have been notable exceptions. 
Since the Stop Soros law has been passed, it is an all-purpose 
weapon against political opponents who will have to severely watch 
what they say or do about migration, because based on the text 
virtually any comment suggesting that immigration can be beneficial 
could be construed as falling within the vague concept of supporting 
migration. 
 
CEU leaves
During the last year, the CEU scandal has morphed from a hot battle 
in international public opinion and diplomacy to a war of attrition, 
where the Hungarian government went as far as it could without 
committing to either letting the Central European University stay or 
banning it outright. Instead, Orbán was refusing to make a decision. 
The government’s indecision was a serious strain on the university’s 
ability to attract applicants and scholars, who were understandably 
concerned about studying and working at a university with such 
an uncertain future. Fidesz appeared to have figured out that the 
uncertainty might be sufficient damage for CEU that it might be 
tempted to leave without being officially thrown out of the country, 
as the Open Society Foundations have.
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In late October, CEU rector Michael Ignatieff announced that if an 
agreement was not reached by the beginning of December, the 
university would move its core operations to Vienna. The Hungarian 
government still refused to sign the bilateral agreement with the 
State of New York. As we highlighted in detail in the foreign policy 
chapter of this publication, the newly appointed US-ambassador, 
the Trump-supporting businessman David Cornstein, initially also 
stood up for CEU. However, when it became clear that Orbán’s 
intentions would not change, Cornstein started to blame Soros for 
the lack of agreement.
CEU’s self-imposed deadline passed on December 1st. Two 
days later, the university officially announced it would be leaving 
Hungary. Some Hungarian-accredited courses would still be 
taught in Budapest, but these account for less than one-fifth of 
CEU’s degrees. New students beginning classes at CEU in 2019 will 
start in Austria, „a country where the rule of law and respect for 
free institutions still means something”, as Ignatieff put it. “This is 
unprecedented. An American institution was forced out of a NATO 
ally. A European institution was forced out of an EU Member State,” 
he added. Nearly everyone, regardless of political views, who has 
had experience with higher education understands the magnitude 
of the loss of CEU.
Many of Orbán’s foreign backers in the European People’s Party 
(EPP) had referred to CEU’s closure as a red line but with European 
elections approaching they decided that Orbán can get away with 
it. Although it was evident that kicking the university out would be 
a provocation, the Hungarian prime minister apparently felt that he 
was strong enough in his position to allow himself this move as well.
To allay American concerns, the Orbán government has decided 
to compensate for the ejection of one US institution in Hungary 
by inviting another, ideologically more compatible alternative, the 
Catholic school Notre Dame, which is perceived as leaning in a more 
conservative direction. In terms of the debate, the government’s 
decision to sign an agreement with the state of Indiana – even as 
it refused to do the same with the much earlier agreement drafted 
in consultation with New York state, where CEU is registered – it 
simultaneously highlighted the government’s deliberate foot-
dragging and its seeming open-mindedness to foreign educational 
institutions – as long as they comply with some arbitrary criteria. 
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In the media, despite the enormous concentration in the traditional 
media segments (television, radio and print), there are still – mostly 
online – targets left that Fidesz might try to take control of. While the 
situation of the leading commercial TV channel, RTL Klub seems to be 
stable at the moment, the most important independent online news 
site, Index appears to be more vulnerable now. It also bears pointing 
out that while Orbán has not seen fit to pull the trigger yet, Fidesz also 
has the fate of the only opposition television channel, ATV, and the 
only opposition daily newspaper, Népszava, in its hands – through 
state advertising. As these are media with rather limited audience 
reach that does not include anyone who would ever consider voting 
for Fidesz, Orbán has graciously decided that these are necessary 
ornaments on the façade that poses as democracy in Hungary today.
Apart from the major question whether the government will finally 
address the perennial crisis in education and healthcare, the other 
area of interest is which institutions will be next to get caught up in the 
centralisation craze. As of this writing, the debate about the structure and 
funding for the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) is still ongoing, but 
eight years of experience suggest that the best conceivable scenario for 
MTA are minor concessions. What will happen to MTA in 2019 will also 
serve as a signal to other institutions. However, the science community 
has already received a clear signal in 2018: despite massive international 
pressure, including a most emphatic defence by Orbán’s formal allies in 
the European Parliament, CEU was ultimately forced to leave Budapest 
behind and is moving most of its educational activities to Vienna.
In recent months the situation surrounding the embattled NGOs has 
remained quiet. This might well be part of the minimum deal that the 
EPP has wrought from Orbán in return for Fidesz being allowed to 
stay in the EPP for the time being. But it is unlikely that this situation 
will persist after May 2019. Unless Orbán and his allies receive an 
unexpected electoral drubbing that will make the Hungarian prime 
minister more vulnerable to pressure, he will likely use the new power 
constellation after the EP election to turn up the heat on independent 
organisations that inconveniently scrutinise the government’s 
activities. What form that will take is of course still open, but a flexible 
and potentially arbitrarily expansive interpretation of the existing 
provisions of the NGO law is a likely instrument. Furthermore, its 
two-thirds majority gives the government the latitude to pick and 
choose a wide variety of tools from the authoritarian playbook. 
There are signs now that Fidesz is moving towards a more comprehensive 
approach to state capture, which also involves the implementation of 
something akin to a long-term ideological/social engineering project. It 
is still too early to tell whether the set of acts and policies labelled as 
the new “culture war” in Hungary are only about the centralisation/
expropriation of funds and institutional control – with the vital benefit 
of crowding out any alternative worldviews, be they political or cultural 
– or whether there is actually a cultural/educational programme that 
will accompany this. There is a lot of talk in Fidesz and among its fellow 
travellers about the need to reshape the way society thinks, to scale 
back the sway that liberal ideas presumably still hold over large swathes 
of public life. And while this has to some extent manifested itself in the 
educational curriculum, there is no pervasive sense yet of propagandistic 
indoctrination in education, the influence is more subtle. Institutional 
takeover may of course turn into the control over ideas. Someone like 
Orbán, who is envisioning to stay in power at least until 2030, knows that 
the visions of the people who control the money and the jobs will exert 
an influence on the way society thinks. Still, in itself institutional control 
is not as aggressive as overt propaganda and indoctrination in education 
and culture, and a government whose propaganda budget (the aggregate 
costs of direct state propaganda, state advertising, public media funding 
and various subsidies for pro-government media) is roughly on par with 
its spending on higher education appreciates the difference. One of the 
questions for next year is whether the government takes the long view 
of institutional control or accelerates the pace of establishing ideological, 
social and cultural hegemony.
5.4 Outlook on the Hungarian society in 2019
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In a sense, the past year has brought a vital piece of much needed 
clarity to the analysis of where Hungary stands. In the perennial 
debate of the past years on the question of “Is Hungary under Fidesz 
still a democracy?”, the ground has shifted subtly over the years, but 
an answer remained elusive. Fidesz’s stunning election victory with 
another parliamentary supermajority – the third election in a row with 
nearly the same parliamentary majority despite an almost 10-point 
oscillation in the governing party’s share of the votes – has clearly re-
centred the debate among large segments of the analyst/intellectual 
class, who now largely agree that whatever this regime is, it is not 
a clear-cut democracy anymore. What’s more, even the public has 
taken notice. As a recent Policy Solutions survey has shown, almost 
half of the Hungarian public (49%) believe that the Orbán government 
cannot be ousted by electoral means, and only 36% believe that it 
is possible for Fidesz to lose an election and leave the government. 
Although that is not necessarily an indication that the respondents 
believe that this is true because of institutional roadblocks erected 
by Fidesz – many of these respondents presumably reflected on 
the weakness of the opposition – it nevertheless betrays a stunning 
scepticism in the power of the electoral process. 
Because the shift has been so imperceptible over the past years, with 
Fidesz’s slowly chipping away at ever new cornerstones of the ruins of 
the pre-2010 political superstructure, there was no “eureka” moment 
when the collective wisdom proclaimed that they had given up on the 
notion that Hungary might still be a democracy. The parliamentary 
election of 2018 was more of an alarm bell going in the heads of 
many people who already knew what had happened but had not quite 
processed the logic of the totality of changes in their own minds. 
Those who defend Fidesz’s acts argue that the government’s 
suppression of civic life, its media market interventions which are 
stifling opposition media and place growing hurdles in the way 
of investigative journalism, the serious blows against academic 
freedom and the creeping take over by party personnel of the 
judiciary and the universities, are nothing but the government’s 
implementation of its democratic mandate. Extending 
governmental control to walks of life which were until recently 
seen as no-go zones for politics is presumably what the public 
demands, so the government has no choice but to follow. While 
we know where we are not anymore, i.e. in a democracy as we 
understood the term in 2010, we will not know where we will end 
up until Orbán’s continuously evolving vision will reach another 
clearly identifiable equilibrium. That this will not be a democracy is 
fairly certain, and saying so is no longer a fringe position, which is of 
course a tremendous change compared to a few years ago. 
Orbán’s vaunted “Asian model” is working thus far, with over 
4% economic growth and a single admitted refugee in Hungary 
who was reported about in the news: the approval of the asylum 
application of Nikola Gruevski, the former prime minister of 
Macedonia, epitomises the Hungarian government’s policies in 
more ways than one. Like Orbán, Gruevski was an authoritarian 
pro-Russia leader in the region whose reign collapsed in a scandal 
that he failed to contain, forcing him to choose between prison 
(for a variety of illegal actions) and exile in a country with a friendly 
government who understands why he had to do what he did. 
Everyone, from Viktor Orbán and the other top Fidesz leaders all 
the way to the opposition feel that the 2018 parliamentary victory 
was different than Fidesz’s previous victories. From Orbán’s 
perspective, there is at least a temporary sense that his power is 
secure, which is why he is day-dreaming about staying in office 
at least until 2030 and making Hungary one of Europe’s five most 
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prosperous countries (again an allusion to the Far East Asian model 
of how popular authoritarian regimes are built). While staying in 
office until the year 2030 may even sound a bit too modest from 
Orbán, the economic aspiration is simply outlandish.  
The last year was also a powerful reflection of the enthusiasm 
with which the Hungarian regime is embracing a lot of the dubious 
aspects of the authoritarian models of development. More 
specifically, the government’s control over public information and 
the media has taken a huge step forward by the legalised creation 
of an unprecedented media empire that operates under direct 
government control.  Such an empire – built out of the “voluntary” 
donations of Fidesz-friendly businesspersons – could never have 
come into existence if the laws were taken seriously here. But the 
government decides these issues by fiat, ruling as before that the 
theoretically strict competition rules do not apply when they do not 
suit him. 
Historical analysis is always a heroic effort at looking back, drawing 
a straight line through complex and often contradictory events and 
showing retrospectively how something that was far from obvious 
at the time was in fact an inevitable development. The consolidation 
of Fidesz’s illiberal regime was not inevitable, however, no matter 
how it will be seen in hindsight. It’s the aggregate result of choices 
made by leading politicians in the pro- and anti-Fidesz camps, 
as well as relevant international players who opted for timidity 
when assertiveness would have been needed. These combined 
with a favourable global economic climate, the refugee crisis and 
a Hungarian public that remains relatively placid because it places 
a greater value on the benefits of this process – or because they 
simply do not accept the notion that the old liberal democratic order 
was better when it brought them a fiscal crisis, an economic crisis 
and a private debt crisis, along with pervasive insecurity.  
Following a disastrous year for the opposition, the series of 
demonstrations that were sparked by the controversial „slave law” 
have offered some hope to the voters who are dissatisfied with 
the way Hungary is being run by the Orbán government. The new 
law seems to have galvanized Orbán’s opponents in a way nothing 
else could so far. The leaders of opposition parties and activists 
are sensing new possibilities as – for the first time since 2010 – 
a new protest movement seems to be building against Orbán and 
his Fidesz party. In the last weeks of 2018, the main message was 
unity against Fidesz as all opposition parties plus most trade unions 
stood together against the government. Such unity will be difficult 
to maintain. However, cooperation across parties, regardless of 
ideologies, will be a must if the opposition would like to achieve 
some success at the 2019 local elections. Besides cooperation the 
other key question for 2019 is whether the opposition parties will 
be able to convince their frustrated potential voters that voting is 
still making sense or whether a deep sense of apathy remains the 
key characteristic of opposition voters. 
The year 2018 was seminal not only in terms of the aggressiveness 
with which Fidesz asserted its anti-democratic agenda within 
Hungary, but also because it has now firmly entrenched Hungary as 
part of Vladimir Putin’s allies, rebuffing the entreaties of Hungary’s 
western allies on a variety of high profile issues, such as the 
expulsion of the Central European University, the pressure on NGOs, 
the admittance into Hungary of Gruevski, and the recent extradition 
of Russian arms smugglers to Russia rather than the American 
side that had conducted the investigation against them and had 
presented the evidence against them to the Hungarian authorities. 
Surveys may show that the Hungarian public remains ambivalent 
about the idea that Hungary’s place is in the East, but at the political 
level the relevant international players have come to understand 
the trend – under Orbán, Hungary is only formally an EU and NATO 
member, in reality its government does not mind breaking with the 
internal codes and agreements of these organisations. 
For the European Union, this realisation should make clear that 
Viktor Orbán’s ambitious vision to reshape European politics 
in Fidesz’s illiberal image (recently re-dubbed as its variant of 
“Christian Democracy”) is a threat that now reaches far beyond 
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the small country at the EU periphery. Orbán has succeeded in 
establishing himself as the embodiment of what the rising far-
right in the traditional core of the EU, e.g. Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, as well as many other EU member states, wishes to 
emulate. 
None of the trends observed in 2018 were new, of course, they 
are all consequential steps in the rough playbook that Fidesz 
has pursued for years now. What is clear, however, is that the 
government has become emboldened by its constitutional two-
thirds majority, it feels eminently secure in its domestic position 
and also perceives the international climate as far more favourable 
than before. The space for limiting the building of the Fidesz regime 
in Hungary is rapidly shrinking, and going into 2019 there are still 
neither domestic nor international players in sight with any realistic 
agenda – be it visions or specific actions – on how to counter Orbán 
and the spread of authoritarian populism in Europe and beyond. 
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